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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
WHAT DO AUDITORS PROMISE THEIR GOVERNMENTAL AUDIT 
CLIENTS? WHAT DO GOVERNMENTAL AUDIT CLIENTS WANT? 
AUDIT PROPOSAL EVIDENCE FROM GOVERNMENTAL AUDIT 
PROCUREMENT PROCESSES 
 
 
This dissertation, consisting of two studies, analyzes a dataset of audit proposals 
to investigate auditors’ impression management strategies, and, audit procurement quality 
in the public sector. Text based analytic methods are employed to examine the content of 
audit proposals, which were submitted for government audit engagements in fifteen 
states. 
  
The first study investigates auditors' marketing language and hypothesizes that 
CPA firms will project a cooperative, non-independent image in audit proposals to 
impress potential clients. The results suggest that CPA firms, especially larger ones, 
project a persona of a cooperative and trustworthy service provider rather than presenting 
themselves as independent auditors. In addition, CPA firms self-portray more 
independence when client management is involved in a procurement process compared to 
when an independent state audit agency selects the auditor. Responding to the PCAOB's 
(2013) concern about auditors' commercial interests and marketing materials, the findings 
suggest that CPA firms’ marketing language may threaten perceived auditor 
independence and thus are important to security markets regulators, practitioners, and 
decision makers. 
 
The second study examines the association between auditor selection and 
perceived audit service qualities in audit proposals. Based on agency theory and prior 
research, this study predicts that government clients will choose an auditor whose audit 
proposal reflects more perceived audit quality attributes and that this association will be 
stronger for states with higher political competition or lower perceived risk of corruption. 
The results indicate that government clients tend to select an auditor who emphasizes 
competence, is a predecessor auditor, and, is less expensive. The findings provide 
insights into governmental audit procurement practices and the determinants of auditor 
selection decisions in the public sector. 
 
 
 The dissertation contributes to the literature by creating a new, unexplored dataset 
of audit proposals, developing and validating linguistic categories related to the concepts 
of auditor independence, relationship marketing, and competence, and exploring potential 
threat of audit firms’ marketing materials to the appearance of auditor independence. 
 
KEYWORDS: Impression Management, Auditor Independence,  
    Perceived Audit Quality Attributes, Audit Procurement,  
  Auditor Selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yu-Tzu Chang   
Author 
 
April 22, 2015     
Date 
 
 
WHAT DO AUDITORS PROMISE THEIR GOVERNMENTAL AUDIT 
CLIENTS? WHAT DO GOVERNMENTAL AUDIT CLIENTS WANT? 
AUDIT PROPOSAL EVIDENCE FROM GOVERNMENTAL AUDIT 
PROCUREMENT PROCESSES 
 
By 
 
 
Yu-Tzu Chang 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Dan Stone    
Director of Dissertation 
 
 Dr. Dan Stone    
 Director of Graduate Studies 
 
 April 22, 2015   
 Date 
  
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 I would like to thank the Von Allmen School of Accountancy, the Gatton College 
of Business and Economics, and the University of Kentucky Graduate School for their 
generous and ongoing financial support.  
 I especially thank my dissertation chair, Dr. Dan Stone, for his insight and 
instructive comments at every stage of the dissertation process. Dan deserves and has my 
deepest gratitude for chairing this dissertation. Without his support, I would not be able to 
complete this project on schedule. I also wish to thank my dissertation committee 
members, Dr. Urton Anderson, Dr. Simon Bonner, and Dr. Monika Causholli, for their 
guidance and contribution on this project. The Von Allmen faculty and Ph.D. students 
also helped me to improve my dissertation by providing invaluable comments at a 
number of brownbag and workshop sessions. I greatly appreciate it. 
 In addition to the above, I express my sincere appreciation for the support of my 
family. My parents, Jung-Tai and Jui-Feng, always encourage me to pursue my dreams 
and happiness. My sister, Yu-Hsuan, supports me emotionally throughout my time in the 
doctoral program. She was always there for me during my ups and downs. Without the  
love and understanding of my family, I would not have made it to this point in my life. 
Lastly, special thanks to my cat, Yaya, for being with me for the past ten years. Her 
company made me feel peaceful and loved.  
  
iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 Acknowledgements………………………………………………………...................  
 
iii 
List of Tables………………………………………………………………................ vi 
Chapter 1: Introduction………………………………………………………............. 1 
Chapter 2: Study 1.................………………………………………………….............  5 
2.1. Introduction ……………………………................................................  5 
2.2.     Background and Theory…………………………………….................. 8 
    2.2.1.     Impression Management Theory………………………….............. 10 
    2.2.2.     Desirable Audit Service Attributes………………………............... 12 
2.3.     Development of Hypotheses…………………………………................ 15 
    2.3.1.     Management Influence Over Auditor Selection............................... 
 
16 
    2.3.2.     Audit Firm Size......…………………………………….................. 19 
2.4.     Data and Method...........…………………………………….................. 21 
         2.4.1.     Sample and Data Collection............................................................. 21 
         2.4.2.     Linguistic Methods........................................................................... 22 
          2.4.2.1.   Dictionary Development........................................................... 22 
          2.4.2.2.   Procedures................................................................................. 24 
   2.4.3.     Mixed-Effect Methods.................... ................................................. 24 
            2.5.    Results.........................……………………………………...................... 27 
         2.5.1.     Descriptive Statistics........................................................................ 27 
         2.5.2.     Tests of Hypotheses.......................................................................... 31 
         2.5.3.     Supplemental Analysis..................................................................... 34 
            2.6.    Discussion, Limitations, and Summary..............…………....................... 36 
Chapter 3: Study 2.................………………………………………………….............  52 
3.1. Introduction ……………………………................................................. 52 
3.2.     Background and Theory…………………………………….................. 55 
    3.2.1.     Governmental Audits and Procurement Practices..……….............. 55 
    3.2.2.     Auditor Selection and Agency Theory...………………….............. 58 
    3.2.3.     Product Differentiation Theory...…...........……………….............. 61 
    3.2.4.     Perceived Audit Quality Attributes............……………….............. 63 
3.3.     Development of Hypotheses…………………………………................ 66 
    3.3.1.     Auditor Selection and Perceived Audit Service Qualities................ 66 
    3.3.2.     Political Competition.……………………………………............... 68 
    3.3.3.     Perceived Risk of Corruption....…………………………............... 70 
3.4.     Data and Method...........…………………………………….................. 71 
         3.4.1.     Sample and Data Collection............................................................. 71 
         3.4.2.     Linguistic Methods........................................................................... 71 
         3.4.3.     Discrete Choice Modeling................................................................ 72 
          3.4.3.1.   Model 1..................................................................................... 72 
          3.4.3.2.   Model 2 and 3........................................................................... 75 
iv 
 
            3.5.     Results.........................……………………………………..................... 76 
         3.5.1.     Descriptive Statistics........................................................................ 77 
         3.5.2.     Tests of Hypotheses......................................................................... 79 
         3.5.3.     Supplemental Analysis..................................................................... 82 
            3.6.     Discussion, Limitations, and Summary..............………….................... 83 
Chapter 4: Conclusion..........………………………………………………….............. 97 
4.1.     Limitations …………………………….................................................. 99 
4.2.     Contributions……………………………………................................... 100 
4.3.     Future Research……………………………………............................... 101 
  
Appendix: Development of Word Lists and Dictionary Validation Process................. 103 
References……………………………………………………………………......................
 
106 
Vita…………………………………………………………………….................................
 
120 
 
  
v 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1, Summary of Attributes....................................................................................... 41 
Table 2.2, Constructed Word Categories and Validity Statistics....................................... 42 
Table 2.3, Sample of Audit Proposals by States…..…………………............................... 43 
Table 2.4, Sample Characteristics …...……………........................................................... 44 
Table 2.5, Descriptive Statistics for Linguistic and Control Variables.............................  45 
     Panel A: Entire Sample.................................................................................................. 45 
     Panel B: Transformation................................................................................................ 45 
     Panel C: Top100 CPA Sample....................................................................................... 45 
     Panel D: Non-Top100 CPA Sample.............................................................................. 46 
     Panel E: Management Involvement Sample.................................................................. 46 
     Panel F: Non-Management Involvement Sample.........................................................  46 
Table 2.6, Cross-Correlation Matrix................................................................................... 48 
Table 2.7, Paired Sample T-Test......................................................................................... 49 
     Panel A: N=332.............................................................................................................. 49 
     Panel B: N=288.............................................................................................................. 49 
Table 2.8, Results From Linear Mixed Effect Models....................................................... 50 
     Panel A: Estimates of Fixed Effects.............................................................................. 50 
     Panel B: Estimates of Covariance Parameters............................................................... 50 
Table 3.1, Constructed Word Categories and Validity Statistics.......................................  87 
Table 3.2, Descriptive Statistics.........................................................................................  88 
     Panel A: Entire Sample.................................................................................................  88 
     Panel B: Transformation...............................................................................................  88 
     Panel C: Winning Proposal Sample.............................................................................. 88 
     Panel D: Unsuccessful Proposal Sample...................................................................... 88 
     Panel E: Predecessor Auditor Sample........................................................................... 89 
     Panel F: Non-Predecessor Auditor Sample................................................................... 89 
Table 3.3, Cross-Correlation Matrix................................................................................... 90 
Table 3.4, Perceived Service Qualities and Auditor Selection Decision............................ 92 
Table 3.5, State Political Competition, Perceived Corruption Risk and                      
                 Audit Procurement Quality................................................................................ 93 
Table 3.6, Results From Linear Mixed Effect Models....................................................... 95 
     Panel A: Estimates of Fixed Effects.............................................................................. 95 
     Panel B: Estimates of Covariance Parameters............................................................... 96 
 
vi 
 
Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
This dissertation consists of two studies examining a dataset of audit proposals 
submitted by auditing firms to obtain public sector engagements. The first study (Study 1) 
investigates audit firms’ impression management strategies, explores the determinants of 
firm images (i.e., personae), and discusses whether certain image attributes, even though 
desired by audit clients, could impair auditor independence in appearance. The second 
study (Study 2) addresses several perceived audit service qualities, examines audit 
procurement quality by testing the association between those perceived quality attributes 
retrieved from audit proposals and auditor selection decisions in a request-for-proposal 
(RFP) process, and, inspects the effect of environmental factors on audit procurement 
quality. 
Investigating audit firms’ impression management in audit proposals has important 
implications for standard setters and practitioners. Recently, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB 2013) calls for attention to CPA firms’ marketing 
materials and underlying marketing strategies, which could be at odds with audit quality 
and independence. Like other professions, certified public accountant firms (CPA firms) 
have interests in building close client relationships to maximize profit so their practice 
remains economically viable. However, it potentially threatens the public’s confidence in 
the value of audit if a firm’s commercial considerations conflict with auditors’ 
professionalism and further affect audit performance (e.g., Brown 2005). Therefore, it is 
important to understand whether a firm’s marketing language promotes a close client-
auditor relationship but, at the same time, endangers the appearance of auditor 
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independence. The study results provide insights into how CPA firms use audit proposals 
to market their services and how extensive marketing language could impair the 
appearance of auditor independence. There are currently no constraints on auditors’ 
marketing materials; nevertheless, regulators and practitioners should be aware of and 
attentive to the potential effects of audit firms’ marketing language, whether it is made 
intentionally or unintentionally. 
The Governmental Audit Quality Center (GAQC) of the American Institute of 
CPAs (AICPA) recognizes and promotes the importance of quality governmental audits 
and the value of such audits to government auditees. Examining the effectiveness of 
governmental audit procurement practices has important implications to public officials 
and the public. Each year, billions of dollars in federal grants are awarded to state and 
local governments, and an increase in grants invokes a variety of grant management 
challenges in government entities (Government Accountability Office 2012). As public 
officials can benefit from a quality audit in many ways (e.g., improving performance and 
accountability; enhancing citizens and stakeholders’ confidence), a well-designed audit 
procurement practice that acts as a mechanism for ensuring audit quality (GAO 1986; 
AICPA 1987) should be of interest to policy makers. Effective audit procurement 
practices also benefit the public. In spite of laws and policies regulating public officials’ 
conduct, a number of government accounting scandals uncovered in the past decades 
demonstrate the importance of government auditing and the role of external auditors as 
gatekeepers of public resources. However, even though audit procurement is common in 
the public sector, we know little about the practice itself or the determinants of the quality 
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of audit procurement. In addition, understanding the audit procurement process in the 
public sector may also hold insights and benefits for private audit procurement processes.   
Both studies use a hand-collected dataset that consists of 378 audit proposals 
submitted by 133 CPA firms to 123 government audit engagements. The analysis of 
proposals employs a text analysis application called Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
(LIWC). Study 1 investigates audit firms’ marketing language and persona reflected in 
audit proposals. Impression management theory suggests that the firms will project 
desirable images to their clients. The results are consistent with the prediction that CPA 
firms, especially larger ones, project a persona of a cooperative and trustworthy service 
provider, instead of an independent auditor, in their proposals. Study 2 examines the 
association between auditor selection decision and perceived audit service qualities in 
audit proposals. Agency theory suggests that agency problems (i.e., conflicts of interest 
between public officials and taxpayers) will induce a need for a quality audit, and a high 
political competition in a state could intensify this need (Baber 1983). The study 
predictions are that government clients will choose an auditor whose audit proposal 
reflects more perceived audit quality attributes, and that this association will be stronger 
for states with higher political competition. I found that descriptions of auditor’s 
competence in audit proposals predict auditor selection decisions in government audits. 
Nevertheless, no evidence presented herein shows that auditor independence is associated 
with auditor selection decision in a RFP process. In addition, audit clients, on average, 
tend to hire a predecessor auditor (i.e., longer tenure). The overall results, however, do not 
support the study hypotheses related to the effects of the environmental factors (i.e., 
3 
political competition and perceived risk of political corruption) on the quality of audit 
procurement practices. 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 covers auditor 
impression management and the determinants (Study 1) and includes a review of literature, 
the pertinent theory, development of hypotheses, data selection, methodology, the results 
and statistical analyses, and the discussion and conclusion. Chapter 3 relates auditor 
selection decisions and perceived audit service qualities (Study 2) and provides a review 
of literature on auditor selection, the pertinent theories, development of hypotheses, data 
selection, methodology, the results and statistical analyses, and the discussion and 
conclusion. Chapter 4 summaries the studies and concludes. 
Copyright © Yu-Tzu Chang 2015 
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Chapter 2 
Study 1: Auditor Impression Management Strategies in Government Audit 
Engagement 
2.1. Introduction 
Study 1 discusses an overarching research problem: whether audit firm 
impression management is at odds with auditor independence in appearance. Using 
public audit data, I examine audit firms’ impression management and marketing 
strategies through their language usage in audit proposals. Specifically, this study 
investigates (1) the persona or image that CPA firms project in their proposals and (2) 
whether these images differ by audit firm and procurement characteristic. It is important 
to understand how audit firms market their services through impression management, as 
firms’ commercial considerations reflected in assurance marketing materials may 
influence audit quality and independence. 
Auditor independence is a cornerstone of the auditing profession and a foundation 
for audit quality (Caswell and Allen 2001). However, a series of financial scandals in the 
early 2000s revealed evidence of a failure of the U.S. auditing system to deliver true 
independence (Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, and Bazerman 2006). Some researchers debate the 
impossibility of true independence due to auditors’ unconscious biases. For example, 
Bazerman, Morgan, and Loewenstein (1997) suggest that audit firms impair their 
independence with clients due to unconscious biases (i.e., inherent self-serving biases) in 
a contracting process. Moore et al. (2006) believe that unconscious bias is an important 
source of violations of auditor independence and far more pervasive than intentional 
corruption. Many other threats to auditor independence have been identified, including 
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economic dependence, provisions of non-audit service, high competition, lengthy tenure, 
and closeness of auditor-client relationships (e.g., CICA 2002; Swanger and Chewning 
2001; SEC 2000). Identifying factors affecting the appearance of independence is 
essential because financial statement users cannot accurately assess actual auditor 
objectivity (McGrath, Siegel, Dunfee, Glazer, and Jaenicke 2001) but only its appearance. 
That is, even if auditors are in fact independent, the lack of the appearance of 
independence compromises overall independence. 
This study examines auditor impression management as a potential threat to 
auditor independence in appearance. Particularly, I investigate whether CPA firms create 
and project a persona of a cooperative and customer-oriented service provider in audit 
proposals, which may compromise auditor objectivity in appearance and thus threaten 
perceived auditor independence. Based on the theories of relationship marketing and 
impression management, this study, first, predicts that audit firms will highlight desirable 
images in marketing materials to attract prospective clients. The second and third 
hypotheses examine whether managerial involvement in auditor selection decisions and 
audit firm characteristics affect auditors' impression management strategies.  
The hand-collected sample consists of 378 audit proposals submitted by 133 CPA 
firms in governmental RFP processes. The primary targeted data sources are the 
government agencies who maintain a central depository for documents related to RFP's 
for financial and/or single audit services. Text analytic methods are used to examine the 
content of audit proposals. I identified several linguistic cues related to the attributes of 
interest, created corresponding category word lists (i.e., dictionaries) based on a review of 
five audit proposals, and utilized a text analysis application to analyze the data (i.e., 
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capture the occurrences of the words in the developed dictionaries). The results indicate 
that CPA firms, on average, project a persona of a cooperative and trustworthy service 
provider, not an independent auditor, in their proposals. In addition, larger CPA firms 
engage in more relationship marketing strategies in the bidding process than do smaller 
firms. The findings imply that a CPA firm’s commercial interests partially drive its 
impression management and that the personae created by firms may conflict with the 
public’s and the regulators’ expectations of auditor independence (e.g., GAGAS 3.03; 
AICPA Code 0.300.050; AU section 220). 
This paper contributes to auditing research in several ways. First, this paper 
identifies auditor impression management as a potential threat to the appearance of 
auditor independence. This is an important issue to investors, practitioners, and regulators 
as auditor independence is the foundation of the public’s trust in the attest function. The 
study also responds to the PCAOB's (2013) call for attention to CPA firms' commercial 
activities that may impair audit performance. The results suggest that CPA firms may 
create an image with attributes desired by clients but not necessarily the public interest. 
The findings provide insight into how the language in auditors’ assurance marketing 
materials may endanger perceived auditor independence. Second, this study employs 
emerging corpus linguistic and text analytic methods to analyze the audit proposals and 
reveal the implicit promises made by auditors to their governmental clients. It is among 
the first to create and validate word categories that capture these critical messages 
communicated through audit proposals. Lastly, this study utilizes a new and unexplored 
dataset to examine auditor relationship marketing strategies in a governmental RFP 
process. The unique dataset of audit proposals facilitates our understanding of 
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governmental audit procurement practices and CPA firms' marketing communications. 
The findings are important for practicing auditors, auditees, and the public interest 
because auditors' impression management strategies may affect clients' auditor selection 
results, perceived auditor independence, and audit quality. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 addresses the study background and 
the supporting theories. Section 2.3 discusses the development of hypotheses, and Section 
2.4 describes the method and the measurement of variables. Section 2.5 presents 
descriptive statistics and analysis results. Section 2.6 concludes with a summary of the 
first study. 
2.2. Background and Theory  
Auditor-client relationships differ from typical buyer-seller relationships mainly 
due to the nature of audit services. Specifically, although audit clients hire and pay 
auditors, the intended users of audit services are existing and potential investors, lenders, 
and other creditors. A potential conflict of interest between management and the financial 
statement users raises a concern that auditors may also face a potential conflict of interest 
when auditors are not independent of management (Bazerman et al. 1997). In fact, 
numerous corporate accounting scandals (i.e., Enron, WorldCom) have called attention to 
the issue of impairment of auditor independence. As a result, regulatory reforms have 
increasingly focused on promoting auditor independence. For example, a primary goal of 
the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is to enhance external auditor independence. 
However, some studies suggest that the auditing reforms of SOX may not work as 
expected in practice instead (e.g., Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew 2003; Fiolleau, 
Hoang, Jamal, and Sunder 2013). 
8 
The increasingly complex business environment intensifies the competition 
among audit firms, which may further erode auditor independence. Responding to 
increasing competition in the audit market, more firms have adopted a marketing 
orientation (e.g., Ahmed and Hopson 1990), which emphasizes the importance of 
meeting clients' needs and developing a long-term relationship with clients, potentially 
over auditor independence. The Big 4 firms, as the leaders in audit markets, recognize the 
value of relationship marketing. For instance, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) website 
asserts a commitment to help their clients to address both present and future business 
challenges in the US market1. The firm claims to deliver audit value by meeting clients' 
business needs and develop its reputation by building lasting relationships with their 
clients. Similarly, Deloitte declares that it will provide timely communications regarding 
professional developments and insights for their clients' business2,  in addition to core 
audit services (i.e., audit financial statements and report on internal controls). The other 
two Big 4 firms, KPMG and Ernst &Young, use a similar marketing approach. 
The accounting literature recognizes the importance of the application of 
relationship marketing concepts in the context of auditing. For instance, Ruyter and 
Wetzels (1999) examine affective commitment in auditor-client relationships and suggest 
that perceived service quality, trust, and interdependence motivate clients to continue 
their relationships with an audit firm. A more recent study suggests that audit clients 
prefer a cooperative, trusting, and long-term relationship with their auditors, in which 
they can seek advice and feedback from the auditors beyond core audit services (i.e., 
1 PwC. 2015. “Financial Statement Audit.” Accessed March 30. http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/audit-
services/financial-statement-audit/index.jhtml. 
2 Deloitte. 2015. “Financial Statement & Internal Control Audit Services. Delivering Specialized Audit 
Services.” Accessed March 30. http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/Services/audit-enterprise-risk-
services/Financial-Statement-Internal-Control-Audit/index.htm. 
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value-added auditing) (Fontaine and Pilote 2012). However, an intimate auditor-client 
relationship may threaten auditor independence (e.g., Windsor and Ashkanasy 1995; 
Bamber and Iyer 2007). In fact, the Independence Standards Board (ISB 2000) identified 
auditors' familiarity with the client as one of five threats to auditor independence. 
Related issue concerns auditors' commercial attitudes and interests. Some scholars 
are concerned that growing commercialism encourages accounting firms to develop an 
organizational culture that emphasizes profit and commercial gain over professional 
independence and objectivity (Wyatt 2004; Zeff 2003). The PCAOB (2013) also argues 
that auditors' commercial interests and marketing strategies may influence audit quality 
and independence. In summary, the increasingly intimate auditor-client relationship (e.g., 
Toffler and Reingold 2003) and auditors' commercialism (e.g., Suddaby, Gendron, and 
Lam 2009; Carrington, Johed, and Öhman 2011) may affect accounting professionalism 
and professional values and thereby erode audit firm independence. 
2.2.1. Impression Management Theory 
Goffman (1959) introduces the theory of impression management, which 
describes a person's performance as the presentation of self and proposes that people 
adjust their behaviors to project a certain image or impression to others. In sociology and 
social psychology, impression management is a goal-oriented, conscious or unconscious, 
process in which “people present a favorable public image of oneself so that others will 
form positive judgment” (Newman 2009 p. 184). The notion of impression management 
also applies to an organization's practices in professional communication and public 
relations. Organizational managers recognize that a congruency between organizational 
actions and the interests of the public are critical to organizational survival (e.g., Meyer 
10 
and Rowan 1977). By regulating and controlling information in social interaction 
(Piwinger and Ebert 2001), corporations establish and maintain desirable public 
perception, e.g., “branding” initiatives. 
In accounting, voluntary disclosure research applies the theory of impression 
management to explain why organizations disclose selective financial information. 
Studies suggest that management can signal organizational actions through textual 
content (i.e., disclosures in annual reports, chief executive officers' statements, 
sustainability reports) and graphical disclosure (i.e., key financial variable graphs in 
annual reports) to manage public impressions (i.e., environmental and social 
responsibility, good performance) (Aerts 2005; Cho, Michelon, and Patten 2012; Dilla 
and Janvrin 2010; Neu, Warsame, and Pedwell 1998; Warsame, Neu, and Simmons, 
2002). In auditing, the theory of impression management is used to predict that the 
auditing profession has an interest in creating and maintaining a public image that 
emphasizes auditors’ trustworthiness. For example, Neu's (1991) case study of Canadian 
audit firms investigates the profession's impression management activities3. In a recent 
study, Gold, Gronewold, and Salterio (2014) propose that an auditor's own impression 
management concerns can affect audit performance. Specifically, the study examines the 
effect of error management climate (i.e., the treatment of audit staff by superiors) on 
auditors’ error-reporting decision and finds that auditors are less willing to their report 
conceptual than mechanical errors. One explanation for this result is that auditors believe 
that reporting their own conceptual errors is more problematic for their image than is 
reporting mechanical errors. The relative unwillingness to report conceptual errors can be 
3 His findings suggest four sets of institutional practices that help to create and maintain the impression of 
the trustworthy auditor: (1) professional entrance requirement, (2) maintenance of a professional 
technology, (3) good works activities, and (4) disciplinary activities. 
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an issue to audit quality, given that conceptual errors may be more consequential than are 
mechanical errors. 
Impression management suggests that auditors will project desirable public 
images to potential clients in their marketing materials. The next section discusses several 
desirable public images (i.e., perceived audit service quality attributes) that auditors are 
likely to highlight in their proposals with an intention to affect potential clients’ 
perceptions. 
2.2.2. Desirable Audit Service Attributes 
Independence 
Auditor independence is widely recognized as the cornerstone of the auditing 
profession as it is the foundation for the public’s trust in the attest function (Caswell and 
Allen 2001). In fact, perceived auditor independence is positively associated with 
investor perceptions of financial reporting credibility (Khurana and Raman 2006). 
Researchers also view independence as a critical attribute of audit quality. For example, 
DeAngelo (1981) believes that audit quality is a product of auditors' ability to discover 
(i.e., competence) and report (i.e., independence) a breach in the clients' accounting 
system. In short, without independence auditing and attest practices lack value (Wallace 
2004). Regulators and legislators also emphasize the importance of auditor independence. 
For example, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) indicates 
that independence is a distinguishing feature of the audit profession and requires auditors 
who provide auditing and other attestation services be independent both in fact and in 
appearance (Code 0.300.050). In the capital market sector, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) believes that the independence requirement is vital to the securities 
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markets and serves two public policy goals ― fostering high quality audits and 
promoting investor confidence in the integrity of public financial information (SEC 2000). 
In the public sector, general accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS) 
emphasize the importance of independence and require that the audit organization and its 
individual auditors must be independent in all matters relating to the government or 
public audit work (GAO 2011). In addition, while performing audit and attest services, 
“auditors should avoid situations that could lead reasonable and informed third parties to 
conclude that the auditors are not independent and thus are not capable of exercising 
objective and impartial judgment” (GAGAS Section 3.04, 28). The guidance suggests 
that auditors should establish and maintain an independent image (i.e., independence in 
appearance) at all time. 
Relationship Marketing Images (Personae) 
The relationship marketing literature explores clients’ preferences for two 
relationship approaches – transactional or relational approach (e.g., Gronroos 1991, 1997; 
Gummesson 2002). The transactional approach is based on a premise that competition 
and self-interest results in an arm’s length relationship (Morgan and Hunt 1994). In 
contrast, the relational approach is based on a perspective that interdependence and 
cooperation results in a trusting relationship. In survey results, Fontaine and Pilote (2012) 
found that financial executives prefer more of a relational than a transactional approach 
with their external auditors. Their findings suggest that audit clients prefer a cooperative, 
trusting, and long-term relationship with their auditors. As trust is a fundamental 
cornerstone in a cooperative working relationship (e.g., Morgan and Hunt 1994), audit 
13 
firms taking a relational approach are likely to project relationship marketing images–
cooperation and trustworthy–in their audit proposals. 
In addition, client satisfaction is positively associated with auditor-client 
relationships (e.g., Behn, Carcello, Hermanson, and Hermanson 1997). The current study 
examines four determinants of audit client satisfaction: responsiveness, empathy, value, 
and effectiveness. Responsiveness refers to an auditor's ability to react to client needs 
(Butcher, Harrison, and Ross 2013; Iskandar, Rahmat, and Ismail 2010; Duff 2004, 2009; 
Behn et al. 1997; Carcello, Hermanson, and McGrath 1992); for example, the audit firm 
is flexible in tailoring audit services to meet clients' needs. Studies in audit client 
satisfaction support the assertion that client-focused attention (i.e., responsiveness to 
client needs) is an important attribute contributing to client satisfaction (e.g., Behn et al. 
1997, 1999; Iskandar et al. 2010; Butcher et al. 2013). Empathy refers to the degree of 
auditors' understanding of clients’ desires, goals, and business challenges (Duff 2004, 
2009). For instance, the auditor shows concern about the client's business and is proactive 
in providing constructive accounting-related suggestions. Marketing research suggests 
that empathy is a critical component to fostering a close relationship between two parties 
(e.g., Berry, Zeithaml, and Parasuraman 1990; Sin et al. 2005). Value refers to auditors' 
ability to provide value-added audit services, from which clients can benefit beyond the 
statutory audit (e.g., Beattie and Fearnley 1998; Eilifsen, Knechel, and Wallage 2001; 
Fontaine and Pilote 2012; Herda and Lavelle 2013). That is, clients expect auditors to be 
a source of support for their business decision-making activity by providing guidance on 
accounting principles, feedback on internal controls, and general business advice. In fact, 
responding to clients' needs, audit firms' marketing initiatives have actively promoted the 
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value-added audit services (Beattie, Fearnley, and Brandt 2000). Lastly, effectiveness is 
included as a service quality attribute because audit delay in the US local government 
sector has been recognized as problematic to audit clients (Johnson, Davis, and Freeman 
2002; Payne and Jensen 2002). Effectiveness refers to the auditors' ability and 
commitment to perform the audit in a timely manner. For example, the auditor completes 
the audit by the contracted deadline. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the desirable attributes discussed above and provides the 
corresponding definitions and sources. 
< Insert Table 2.1 here > 
2.3. Development of Hypotheses 
Impression management is important to a corporation, or CPA firm, especially 
when the corporation’s external stakeholders cannot directly observe some of its 
organizational activities but rely on public information as an imperfect proxy for these 
activities (e.g., corporate culture, moral conduct). That is, organizations can manage their 
public impressions by selectively providing information to stakeholders through different 
types of communication (e.g., media, annual reports, Tweets). In the audit market, audit 
clients cannot perfectly observe or evaluate the audit services they purchase due to the 
nature of auditing. Therefore, CPA firms may construct their audit proposals as a type of 
marketing material to appeal to potential clients. 
Impression management theory predicts that audit firms will enhance desirable 
aspects of the firm or obfuscate undesirable aspects (Gioia, Schultz, and Corley 2000) in 
their audit proposals in order to shape potential audit clients' perceptions in favor of the 
firm. In contrast, audit professionalism encourages auditors to serve a higher social 
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function and embrace the values of objectivity and independence (Suddaby et al. 2009). 
However, auditors’ commercial interests may drive them to focus on building 
relationships with clients (e.g., Wyatt 2004; Gendron, Suddaby, and Lam 2006). 
Therefore, CPA firms may deliver “blended” messages in audit proposals, which reflect 
both their professional and commercial values. For the following reasons, this study 
predicts that auditors’ commercial considerations will influence their proposal language 
more than do their professional values. First, the purpose of audit proposals is to attract 
potential audit clients. Thus, it is likely that audit firms will include desirable attributes in 
proposals that increase their attractiveness of potential clients. Second, auditors have 
financial incentives (i.e., maximizing profit) to meet clients' expectations or desirability 
(e.g., Zeff 2003). Responding to clients’ relationship preferences, audit firms are likely to 
take a relational approach and to build a cooperative, trusting, and long-term relationship 
with their potential clients. Hence, the first hypothesis: 
H1: Audit firms are more likely to project a persona reflecting relationship marketing 
images than a persona of an independent auditor in their audit proposals. 
To further understand what drives auditor impression management, the next 
sections propose two factors, characteristics of the procurement practice and audit firm 
size, which can affect auditor image management strategies and language usage in audit 
proposals. 
2.3.1. Management Influence over Auditor Selection in Government Audits 
The U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which oversees the 
administration of the federal budget and the effectiveness of agency programs, requires 
funded entities expending $500,000 or more in federal awards to comply with the audit 
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and internal control requirements of Circular A-133 (OMB 2003). These non-federal 
entities must be audited by a public accountant or a Federal, State or Local government 
audit organization, which meets the general standards specified in generally accepted 
government auditing standards (GAGAS). Although the audit and internal control 
requirements of Circular A-133 are uniform across the U.S. states, considerable diversity 
exists in audit procurement policies, regulations, and procedures across states. For 
example, a survey conducted by the National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers 
and Treasurers (NASACT 2012) reports that the state audit agency serves as the primary 
auditor of the basic financial statements in 34 states and the single audits in 13 states. 
CPA firms conduct 100 percent of the basic financial statement audits in 11 states and the 
single audits in 10 states. In most cases, the single audits are conducted jointly by state 
auditors and CPA firms. In addition, in the states where audits are conducted by external 
auditors, state audit agencies and/or audited entities contract with CPA firms for audits. 
That is, in some states, state audit agencies are fully responsible for initiating a RFP 
process and selecting external auditors for hiring governmental entities; however, in other 
states, state audit agencies and management from audited entities jointly select auditors4.  
From reading RFPs documents and talking with personnel from the state auditor 
offices, I assume that the role of a state audit agency is similar to that of audit committees 
4 For example, per discussion with Mr. Giesler, Chief Operating Office at the office of the Auditor of 
Public Accounts (APA) in Kentucky, the Auditor’s office is responsible for initiating a RFP for audit 
services and evaluating the audit proposals received.  The evaluation committee members from the APA 
office review the technical proposal and award points accordingly. The State Auditor then ranks the 
proposed firms based on their scores and begins with the top firm to negotiate for audit fees. If negotiation 
fails, the APA then contacts the firm with the second highest score. However, the review process is 
different in other states. In Ohio, for instance, the Auditor of State works with audited entities to select 
external auditors. Specifically, client management from the audited entities can use any methodology that 
deems to be appropriate to evaluate firms’ audit proposals and have the option to award "Client Preference 
Points" to bidding firms. Members of an evaluation committee from the Auditor of State also review and 
grade firms’ proposals. The selection of the auditor is based on the combined scores from the committee 
and the client management. 
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in the profit sector for two reasons. First, state audit agencies are independent of the 
hiring governmental entities (i.e., audit clients) and thus should exercise their 
independent judgment diligently. Second, the individuals involved in a RFP evaluation 
process are usually the audit professionals in the state audit agencies. In most cases, these 
individuals are experts with experiences in preparing, auditing, analyzing and evaluating 
financial statements. In short, like audit committees in the private sector, state audit 
agencies should act as a mechanism for improving auditor independence in the public 
sector. However, there is little evidence supporting the claim that audit committees 
eliminate threats to auditor independence. 
Little auditing research discusses how client management influences auditor 
selection decisions in the public sector. Wilson and Stewart (1990) found that the quality 
of municipal financial reporting is positively associated with the level of underwriter 
competition in the primary market for new issues of general obligation bonds. Their 
findings suggest that government clients have incentives to employ an independent CPA 
firm auditor to signal the credibility of their financial information, which in turn increases 
competition for bond issues and reduces borrowing costs (e.g., West 1967; Kessel 1971). 
On the other hand, auditing research related to private sector clients often suggests that 
management influence over auditor appointments negatively affect auditor independence 
(e.g., Carcello and Neal 2000, 2003). However, there is no substantial evidence indicating 
how CPA firms would present themselves (i.e., less or more independent) when client 
management is involved in a RFP process. 
Fiolleau et al. (2013) suggest that auditors in a RFP process strategically present 
information that responds to the decision makers' needs and preferences. As a state audit 
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agency and client management are likely to play a different role in a government audit 
and thus may have different preferences, I predict that, in response to the variations in 
each state's evaluation procedures, CPA firms will strategically create different personae 
in their proposals. I state my second hypothesis non-directionally as follows: 
H2: Audit firms will strategically project different personae in their audit proposals 
based on the composition of the evaluators in the hiring process. 
2.3.2. Audit Firm Size 
Client importance to audit firms is a potential threat to auditor independence 
(Tepalagul and Lin 2015). When an audit firm economically depends on a client, the 
threat of losing the client would mitigate the auditor’s responsiveness to penalties for 
compromising independence (Falk, Lynn, Mestelman, and Shehata 1999). In other words, 
when receiving compensation that constitutes a significant part of service revenues to the 
auditor, the auditor is financially bonded to the client and thus has an incentive to 
maintain a good client relationship. To warrant future profits, the auditor may 
compromise independence and act in favor of the client to the detriment of the public 
interest (Blay 2005). Hence, client importance (i.e., as a percentage of total revenues) 
may be negatively associated with auditor independence. 
However, audit firm size and reputation may moderate the impact of client 
importance. While holding the client size constant, the proportion of future profits 
generated from a client is less significant to a larger firm than to a smaller one. As 
DeAngelo (1981) suggests, perceived auditor independence is positively related to audit 
firm size as larger audit firms have a lower percentage of total audit fees dependent on 
any one client. In addition, auditor reputation is an important intangible asset that is 
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developed and maintained through effortful management of a firm's public image. Many 
studies assume larger auditors have more valuable reputations (e.g., DeAngelo 1981; 
Barton 2005) and support that auditor independence is positively associated with auditor 
reputation. They argue that building a brand name and reputation is costly and that 
auditors with established reputations have more to lose from misrepresentation. 
Consequently, reputable auditors have a stronger incentive to self-represent as objective, 
independent auditors. The arguments above suggest that large, reputable audit firms have 
stronger incentives to maintain their professional, independent image than do small firms.  
On the other hand, competition in the audit market have forced audit firms to 
consider marketing and branding strategies (e.g., Reid 2008; Jaworski, Kohli, and Sahay 
2000). Studies find that market activities are increasing in the audit industry (e.g., Clow, 
Stevens, McConkey, and Loundon 2009; Hodges and Young 2009; Broberg, Umans, and 
Gerlofstig 2013). One explanation is that professional service firms include marketing in 
their business activities in order to gain a competitive advantage (Hodges and Young 
2009). As relationship marketing can be costly (e.g., Cao and Gruca 2005) and large audit 
firms have more resources than do small firms, I speculate that large audit firms, 
compared to small audit firms, are more likely to engage in relationship marketing in a 
bidding process. That is, they are more likely to project a persona of a cooperative and 
trustworthy service provider in their audit proposals. Based on the arguments above, it is 
unclear how audit firm size would affect auditor impression management. Therefore, the 
third hypothesis is non-directional. 
H3: Audit firm size will affect auditor impression management in audit proposals. 
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The next section discusses the sample and data collection, the study method, and 
the measurement of variables used to test the hypotheses. 
2.4. Data and Method 
2.4.1. Sample and Data Collection 
The sample is constructed using a set of audit proposals submitted by CPA firms 
in a governmental RFP process. A typical audit proposal consists of transmittal letter, 
firm background and qualifications, staff information and experience, and audit plan. The 
primary targeted data sources are the government agencies who maintain a central 
depository for documents related to RFP's for financial and/or single audit services. I 
obtained a complete list of those agencies from the National Association of State 
Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers (NASACT). The NASACT is an organization 
consisting of 56 audit agencies5 that are comprised of state officials who have been 
elected or appointed to the Office of State Auditor, State Comptroller, or State Treasurer 
to deal with the financial management of state government in the 50 states, the District of 
Columbia, and U.S. territories. Requests to the 50 audit agencies for the public records 
related to audit RFPs were made via email, websites, and phone calls. In response to the 
open record requests, the audit agencies of 20 states6 provided documents related to 
2008-2013 audits contracted to CPA firms, including RFP's, audit proposals, and 
5 Three states have more than one audit agency, i.e., Minnesota, New Jersey, and South Carolina. 
6 Twenty states include CO, FL, HA, IL, IN, KS, KY, MI, MO, NC, ND, NH, NJ, NY, OH, OK, TX, VA, 
VT, and WY. The remaining states either do not maintain a central depository for the documents requested 
or do not contract out governmental audits to CPA firms. 
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contracts. The current sample7 includes 133 CPA firms, who submitted 378 audit 
proposals, on 123 engagements from 15 U.S. states8. 
2.4.2. Linguistic Methods 
Accounting and finance research increasingly employs linguistic methods in 
analyzing accounting- or finance-related textual documents. For instance, a stream of 
research analyzes linguistic cues to study in corporate annual reports and financial 
disclosures (Li 2006; Loughran and McDonald 2014), earnings press releases (Demers 
and Vega 2011), firm-specific financial news stories (Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and 
MacSkassy 2008), transcripts of quarterly earnings conference call (Larcker and 
Zakolyukina 2012), and online client reviews of tax preparers (Witherspoon and Stone 
2014). These studies differ in terms of the selection of the linguistic features and the 
techniques used to extract those cues. This paper uses a text analysis application, 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count, or LIWC9, to content analyze audit proposals (i.e., 
capture the occurrences of the words related to the image attributes of interest). The next 
section addresses the development of word categories in this study. 
2.4.2.1. Dictionary Development 
This study utilizes LIWC to capture and count the occurrences of the words 
related to the constructs of interest (i.e., the image attributes in audit proposals). Although 
LIWC has well-developed word lists (e.g., positive and negative emotions words, 
7 Based on a G*Power omnibus multiple regression power analysis, a priori statistical power of the studies 
are adequate (>90%), given medium effect size and the number of the predictors in each study at an alpha 
value of 0.05 (i.e., Type I error rate).  
8 Data from five states (i.e., FL, HA, MO, NY, and TX) is omitted due to incomplete data. 
9 LIWC is an application for studying carious emotional, cognitive, and structural components present in 
individuals' verbal and written speech samples. The LIWC application relies on an internal default 
psychosocial dictionary that defines which words should be counted in the target text files (Pennebaker et 
al., 2007). There are three versions of this application: LIWC, LIWC2001, and LIWC2007. This study uses 
LIWC2007, the most recent evolution as of the date of the study. Hereafter in this paper, I refer LIWC2007 
to as LIWC. 
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cognitive words, pronouns, certainty and tentative words, etc.), its internal default 
dictionary does not capture or measure the constructs in the current study. Therefore, for 
each linguistic attribute listed in Table 2.1, I created a list of words (i.e., dictionary) 
within LIWC by adapting the method of Larcker and Zakolyukina (2012), Li (2006), 
Loughran, McDonald, and Yun (2009), and Witherspoon and Stone (2013) to the present 
data set. Specifically, I randomly sampled five proposals from different CPA firms to 
generate sets of words for each image attribute identified in the previous section. Next, I 
developed category word lists for references to these attributes by adding synonyms10 to 
the corresponding categories. Following Pennebaker et al.'s (2007) procedures, external 
judges validated the dictionaries. Accounting professionals were recruited as independent 
judges to review the preliminary category word lists. They completed a survey instrument 
including two tasks, which asks them to make decisions about an inclusion or exclusion 
of a word in each dictionary word list11. Table 2.2 lists the attributes (word categories), 
words included in each category, and reliability statistics for each category. To validate 
the reliability of the constructed word categories, I calculated the correlations between 
the occurrences of each word in a category with the sum of the other words in the same 
category (Pennebaker et al. 2007). Explanations for the reported low reliability statistics 
are that (1) the uncorrected method used to calculate raw alpha tends to underestimate 
reliability and (2) in terms of the nature of discourse, once people say something, they 
usually do not repeat it in the same paragraph or essay but move to the next topic 
(Pennebaker et al. 2007). Hence, this is unlike validity tests of standardized, 
psychological instruments. 
10 Thesaurus. 2014. Accessed September 2. http://www.thesaurus.com 
11 See Appendix A for a detailed description of the survey instrument and the task procedures.  
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< Insert Table 2.2 here > 
2.4.2.2. Procedures 
The audit proposals received are in different forms including hard copies, 
readable PDF, and image-only PDF. In order to run content analysis, several assistants 
and I performed the following tasks. First, I converted each proposal to a text file. Second, 
an assistant followed instructions to remove irrelevant text and standard languages copied 
from the RFP's, such as standard contract provisions and contract certifications. Third, 
the assistants reviewed the remaining texts to remove misspellings and manually fixed 
errors that occurred in the converting process (i.e., unrecognizable words). Lastly, after 
reviewing the assistants’ work, I imported the files to LIWC and processed the texts with 
the developed dictionary (see Table 2.2) to calculate the percentage of the words related 
to the attributes. Similar to related studies (e.g., Li 2006; Larcker and Zakolyukina 2012), 
this study ignores context and considers the position of a word in a sentence irrelevant for 
classification (i.e., a bag-of-words approach). The next section specifies the models and 
the definitions of the variables. 
2.4.3. Mixed-Effect Models 
This study employs a mixed effect model to examine whether management 
influence over auditor selection and audit firm size affect personae that CPA firms 
project in audit proposals. The mixed effect model is appropriate to fit the data in the 
current study because the audit proposal dataset has a hierarchical design structure (i.e., 
nested data) in which audit proposals are nested within engagements that are nested 
within states. Due to the nested data structure, I assumed a relationship among 
engagements such that an audit procurement process of a state is similar to others in the 
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same state. Likewise, because a CPA firm can submit a proposal to more than one 
engagement in one or different states, I assumed co-dependence between the audit 
proposals and submitting firms. That is, audit proposals submitted by a CPA firm (i.e., 
within firm) should share more attributes than those submitted by other CPA firms (i.e., 
between firms). Those relationships among the observations are referred to as random 
effects. I employed a mixed effect model to estimate the parameters as it is appropriate 
for nested designs (Fidell and Tabachnick 2007; Schielzeth and Nakagawa 2013) and can 
account for both fixed and random effects12 in the current study model. The dependent 
variables are predicted by the fixed effects specified in the model as well as the random 
(nested) effects of Engagement within State, State, and CPA firm. Specifically, I 
regressed four dependent variables separately on several fixed-effect variables including 
indicators for management influence (MgtInf) and for Top 100 CPA firm (Top100) and 
the natural logarithm of proposed audit fee (Fees), proposal word count (WC), and 
engagement size (EngSize); as well as on random-effect variables including the nested 
effect of engagement within State (EngRC(StateRC)), State (StateRC), and CPA firm 
(FirmRC). 
The dependent variables (DVs), IMAGE, refer to four CPA firms’ image 
attributes including Independence (INDP), Cooperation (COP), Trustworthy (Trust), and 
Client Satisfaction (CS). The DVs are four linguistic variables: INDP refers to auditors’ 
integrity and objectivity; COP indicates auditors’ willingness to cooperatively work with 
clients; Trust measures auditors’ reliability; and CS includes four service qualities 
12 Gelman (2005, p. 21) defines effects as fixed in a multilevel model “if they are identical for all groups in 
a population” and as random “if they are allowed to differ from group to group”. In other words, fixed 
effects assume that observations are independent while random effects assume dependent relations among 
observations. 
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(responsiveness, empathy, value, and effectiveness). Table 2.1. provides the detailed 
definitions of the DVs. I operationalized the DVs by adopting Pennebaker et al.’s (2007) 
approach to calculate the percentage of the words related to these image attributes. The 
first independent variable (IV) of interest, MgtInf, is an indicator of whether client 
management has an influence on the auditor choice in a governmental RFP process. The 
second IV of interest, Top100, measuring audit firm size, indicates whether an audit firm 
is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting Today. Three variables are included as 
control variables in the model13. As engagement size and audit fees can directly affect 
auditors’ commercial interests in bidding a job, I controlled for the size of engagement 
(EngSize) and proposed audit fees (Fee), which were measured as the audittee’s operating 
expenditures in a prior year and estimated service fees proposed in the audit proposals, 
respectively. In addition, I included the word count (WC) of audit proposals as a control 
variable because the length of proposals correlates with the linguistic-based DVs. As for 
the random-effect variables, I used the EngRC, StateRC, and FirmRC variables instead of 
the original string variables in the data set. Those ‘RC’ variables contain the same 
information as the original ones; they were simply recoded as nominal scaled variables so 
that the output will be easier to be interpreted. The model is as follows. 
IMAGEijk = β0 + β1*MgtInfi + β2*Top100k +β3*Feeijk  + β4*EngSizeij +β5*WCijk + 
random effects + ε 
where for state i, engagement j, and firm k: 
IMAGE = A vector of four variables, which are simple counts of the words 
related to Independence, Cooperation, Trustworthy, and Client 
Satisfaction divided by the number of words in the proposal ignoring 
articles (wc); 
13 Because the control variables are not normally distributed, the variables are transformed by taking 
logarithms of the raw values before entering into the models. 
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MgtInf = 1 if client management helps to select the auditor, and 0 otherwise; 
Top100 = 1 if the audit firm is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting 
Today, and 0 otherwise; 
Fee = Natural logarithm of proposed audit fee; 
EngSize = Natural logarithm of audittee’s operating expense/expenditures; and  
WC = Natural logarithm of word count in a text file of an audit proposal. 
2.5. Results 
 Descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables are presented below, 
followed by the main results of hypothesis testing. 
2.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The sample includes 378 audit proposals from 133 CPA firms, which were 
submitted to 123 engagements. Table 2.3 demonstrates the composition of the sample by 
states. The majority of the engagements (i.e., 80% of the 123 engagements) in the sample 
are from five states14 including Colorado (19), Illinois (19), Kentucky (40), North 
Carolina (9), and Ohio (12). The majority of the audit proposals (i.e., 87% of the 378 
audit proposals) are from seven states (Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia). On average, each engagement received three audit 
proposals. The proposals in the sample are from 133 CPA firms, of which 32 firms are 
listed as Top100 CPA firms by Accounting Today during the period from 2009 to 2012. 
About 183 (48%) of the proposals were submitted by Top100 CPA firms; of which 24 
(13%) were from the Big 4 accounting firms. 
< Insert Table 2.3 here > 
14 A MANOVA indicates that these five states do not differ from the 45 states in terms of the population 
(F=.729, p=.397), Ranny’s political competition Index (F=.355, p=.554), tax revenue (F=.305, p=.583), 
state revenue per capital (F=.949, p=.335), long-term public debt (F=.013, p=.911), number of state and 
local employees (F=1.110, p=.297), general expenditure (F=.288, p=.594), spending from state and federal 
funds as a percent of state personal income (F=1.019, p=.318), and state economic freedom scores (F=.143, 
p=.707) during the sampled years. 
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Table 2.4 reconciles the samples that were used in the primary analyses. Eight 
proposals were removed from the analyses because they were submitted for a non-
financial statement audit engagement. The remaining 370 proposals are related either 
basic financial statement audits or single audits. In Kentucky, CPA firms are allowed to 
submit one proposal for multiple engagements. For the 2010 and 2012 audit procurement, 
the Kentucky Auditors of Public Accounts (APA) contracted for 39 audit engagements. 
Twenty-five CPA firms responded to the RFPs, and the Kentucky APA received a total 
of 38 audit proposals because some CPA firms submitted proposals to both RFPs. Within 
each RFP, each engagement received an average of eight proposals that were also 
submitted to at least one of other engagements. I removed those 38 KY proposals from 
the main analysis because most of these proposals were submitted to more than one 
engagement (range from two to 20 engagements). This multiple-counting of proposals 
would add noise in the analyses. Lastly, forty-four of the remaining 332 (370-38) 
proposals do not have the information of proposed audit fees. That results in 288 
proposals (332-44) with complete data. The main analyses in the following section used 
both samples (i.e., n=288 and n=332) to test the hypotheses. 
Table 2.5, Panel A reports descriptive statistics on the linguistic-based variables 
retrieved from the audit proposals (n=332) and the control variables. The linguistic-based 
variables, Independence (INDP), Cooperation (COP), Trustworthy (Trust), and Client 
Satisfaction (CS), are measured based on word percentages, which were calculated by 
LIWC as a percentage of matched words against the number of all words ignoring articles 
in a given text file (Pennebaker et al. 2007). Among these variables, the mean values 
suggest that CPA firms more frequently use words related to client satisfaction, followed 
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by cooperation, trustworthy, and independence, in their audit proposals. Affective 
processes (affect), positive emotion (posemo), and negative emotion (negemo) are 
measured based on the default LIWC word dictionaries. The values of posemo are higher 
than those of negemo, which indicates that CPA firms express more positive emotion 
than negative emotion in their audit proposals. WC (word count) measures the total 
number of words in a given file. The average word count in the sample is 6,679 words. 
The average proposed audit fee is $395,955. The range of the proposed fees (Fees) is 
wide: the lowest proposed fee is about $12,000 and the highest is about $6.4 million, 
which suggests high variability in the size and/or the complexity of the engagements in 
the sample. The percentile measure further indicates that the majority of proposed audit 
fees are relatively small (i.e., 75% of the sample is below $260,000). In fact, only 24 
proposed engagement fees are above $1 million. The normality tests (skewness and 
kurtosis) indicate that several variables are not normally distributed. For example, the 
distribution of the variable Fees is highly skewed (Skewness = 3.91) with heavy tails 
(Kurtosis = 16.31). In addition, histograms of the variables indicate outliers at the right 
end of the distributions. Therefore, before modeling, these variables are transformed by 
winsorizing at the 95% percentile or by taking natural logarithms. Panel B reports the 
transformed data. The skewness and kurtosis values indicate that the variables are 
normally distributed after transformation, which are then used in the subsequent analyses. 
The following panels report with the transformed numbers when they are meaningful in 
interpretation. 
< Insert Table 2.5 here > 
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Panels C and D present the composition of the sample by type of CPA firm, 
Top100 (n=183) or non-Top100 (n=149), respectively. The average proposed audit fee is 
higher in the Top100 CPA sample than that in the non-Top100 CPA sample. It suggests 
that either Top100 CPA firms charge premium fees or they have more capacity to bid on 
larger engagements. Except for the variables INDP and negemo, the mean values of all 
other variables for Top100 CPA firms are higher than those for non-Top100 CPA firms15. 
Again, the mean value of INDP is smaller than that of any other linguistic-based variable 
in both samples. Panels E and F represent the composition of the sample by an indicator 
of management involvement in an auditor selection process (i.e., Yes or No). The average 
proposed audit fee is higher in the management involvement subsample than that in the 
non-management involvement subsample. With respect to the linguistic variables, the 
management involvement sample has a higher mean value in INDP but lower in COP, 
Trust, and CS as compared to the non-management sample. In addition, the engagements 
in the management involvement sample are averagely smaller than those in the non-
management sample. 
 Table 2.6 reports correlations of the transformed and binary variables. MgtInf is 
significantly positively correlated with INDP and Fees but negatively correlated with 
Top100, COP, Trust, CS, and EngSize. These results suggest that there are more small 
CPA firms bidding for governmental audit jobs in the states where client management is 
involved in the audit procurement process, compared to the states where independent 
audit agencies select auditors. A possible explanation is that the audit engagements 
contracted out in the states where client management help to select auditors are 
15 An untabulated T-test analysis also shows that the mean values of COP, Trust, CS, and Fees differ 
between the larger and smaller CPA firm subsamples (p<.001). 
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significantly smaller than those in the states where client management is not involved in 
the RFP process (t=2.62; p<0.01). Top100 CPA firms may be less interested in small 
engagements, perhaps because they generate little profit. In addition, when management 
is involved in selecting auditors, CPA firms are more likely to present themselves as 
independent auditors and less likely to employ relationship marketing approaches in their 
audit proposals. The variable Top100 positively correlates with COP, Trust, CS, Fees, 
and EngSize. An explanation of the positive correlations among Top100, Fees, and 
EngSize is that large CPA firms are more likely to bid on large engagements and thus 
propose higher audit fees than do smaller firms. Consistent with the results of a meta-
analysis of audit fee determinants (Hay 2013), the positive correlation between Fees and 
EngSize is indicates that auditors charge more fees for larger, complex engagements. 
Collinearity diagnostics indicate that there is no multicollinearity among the IVs of 
Top100, MgtInf, Fees, EngSize, and WC (i.e., VIF<2.5 in all tests). Among the linguistic 
variables, the correlations of the three RM measures are significant (p < 0.01). 
Interestingly, INDP is positively correlated with Trust and CS, but not with COP. 
< Insert Table 2.6 here > 
2.5.2. Tests of Hypotheses 
H1 predicts that audit firms will more frequently use words related to relationship 
marketing images (i.e., cooperation, trustworthy, client satisfaction) than those related to 
independence in their proposals. I ran a paired sample t-test to examine whether there is a 
significant difference between the average values of those image attributes. Specifically, I 
compared the mean of INDP to that of COP, Trust, and CS, respectively. Table 2.7 Panel 
A (n=332) reports the results of the paired samples tests, which indicate that the mean 
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value of INDP is significantly different (i.e., smaller) than that of COP (t=-18.99), Trust 
(t=-15.57), and CS (t=-43.72)16. In addition, an untabulated one-way ANOVA contrast 
test (planned comparisons) shows that the mean value of INDP is significantly different 
from that of COP, Trust, and CS (t=45.08; p<0.01). The result holds for the sample with 
the 288 observations as reported in Panel B. Therefore, H1 is supported. 
< Insert Table 2.7 here > 
H2 predicts that audit firms will strategically project different personae in their 
audit proposals in response to a different composition of evaluators in the hiring process. 
I used mixed effect models to test the hypothesis. The analysis results of the sample of 
288 and 332 are almost identical because the missing data (i.e., missing-at-random) 
carries no effect in mixed models (Howell 2012). Table 2.8 reports the statistical results 
for the original dataset (n=332 with missing data) and an imputed dataset (n=332 with 
imputed fee data). Assuming the missing values are missing at random, I utilized 
Multiple  Imputation (MI) to generate imputed data for the missing fee values. MI is a 
statistical technique that replaces each missing value with a set of plausible values that 
represent the uncertainty about the right value to impute (Rubin 1987). Five stimulated 
complete datasets (imputation =5) were generated and combined to produce pooled 
estimates as reported here. Table 2.8, Panel A reports the parameter estimates for the 
fixed effects in the linear mixed models. Column (a) reports a significant result for 
management influence (coefficient = 0.06; p = 0.034), which suggests that CPA firms use 
words related to auditor independence in their audit proposals more frequently when 
client management is involved in hiring auditors, compared to when an independent state 
audit agency selects an auditor. Column (b) shows that the results hold for the imputed 
16 With or without winsorization, the results are consistent. The data reported in Table 2.7 are winsorized.  
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sample (MgtInf: coefficient = 2.50; p = 0.012). The results support H2 by indicating that 
when management is involved in selecting an auditor in a public audit, CPA firms are 
more likely to highlight an image of independent auditors in their audit proposals, as 
compared to when an independent state agency selects the auditor. 
< Insert Table 2.8 here > 
H3 predicts that large and small firms will differ in their impression management 
in audit proposals. Similar to H2, H3 is tested using the original and imputed sample. 
Based on the results on Table 2.8, Columns (a) and (b), there is no evidence that larger 
CPA firms highlight auditor independence in audit proposals more, or less, than do 
smaller firms. Columns (c) to (h) report the estimated association between the 
relationship marketing measures and firm size. In the original dataset, firm size is 
positively associated with the relationship marketing measures: COP (coefficient = 0.10; 
p<0.01), Trust (coefficient = 0.10; p<0.01), and CS coefficient = 0.47; p<0.01), as shown 
in Column (c), (e), and (g), respectively. The positive associations are consistent with the 
correlations reported in Table 2.6. The results suggest that Top100 CPA firms use words 
related to the constructs of cooperation, trustworthy, and client satisfaction more 
frequently in their proposals than do smaller firms. In other words, larger firms engage in 
more relationship marketing strategies than do smaller firms. The results hold for the 
imputed dataset as reported in Column (d), (f), and (h). Therefore, H3 is supported. It is 
noteworthy that Fees, with or without imputed data, do not have an effect on the DVs. 
Panel B in Table 2.8 reports the parameter estimated for the random effects in the 
linear mixed models. The total variance estimate for each model is the sum of the 
estimates in each column. An R² type of effect size used to gauge the importance of each 
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random effect can be calculated by dividing each random effect's variance estimate by the 
total variance estimate to arrive at a proportion of variance explained or accounted for by 
each random effect. For example, I found that in Model 1 (Column (a)) the nested effect 
of StateRC is 0.11 (=0.001/0.009), which means that the random nested effect accounts 
for 11% of the variance of the random effects. On the other hand, the random effect for 
FirmRC accounts for 66.67% (0.006/0.009) of the variance of the random effects. 
Although the random effects for EngRC(StateRC) and StateRC do not account for 
significant variance and can be eliminated from the models, I kept them in the model 
since the AIC or BIC value does not improve (i.e., become smaller) after removing these 
two random effects17. Across the different models, FirmRC accounts for the most of the 
variance of the random effects. 
2.5.3. Supplemental Analysis 
I ran a standard general linear model (GLM) for each dependent variable on the 
variables of MgtInf, Top100, Fees, EngSize, WC, and FirmRC18. The untabulated results 
from the GLMs are consistent with those reported in the prior sections. The association 
between INDP and MgtInf is significant at the 0.01 level (coefficient = 0.07, t = 3.891), 
and a R2 of 76.8% indicates a well model fit. Top100 is significantly associated with the 
RM measures (the coefficient on COP is 0.16 with a t-statistic of 2.192, on Trust is 0.205 
with a t-statistic of 3.151, and on CS is 0.553 with a t-statistic of 2.417). The R2  for the 
COP, Trust, and CS models are 76.1%, 70.2%, and 82.8%, respectively. In addition, a 
17 The models reported here and in Table 2.8 have the lowest values in Akaike's Information Criterion 
(AIC) and Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion (BIC). AIC and BIC are measures of the relative quality of a 
statistical model for a given set of data (Dziak, Coffman, Lanza, and Li 2012). They are used as criteria for 
selecting among nested models: the lower the number, the better the model fits the data. 
18 FirmRC is included in the models because it accounts for the most of the variance of the random effects 
as indicated in Table 2.8 Panel B. 
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multivariate analysis19 (MANOVA) reports a significant multivariate effect (p<0.01) for 
the combined dependent variables in respect of MgtInf and Top100CPA (F=10.882 and 
32.878, respectively). 
In the Top100 CPA firm group, 24 out of 183 proposals (approx. 13%) are from 
Big 4 accounting firms. To test whether the results for H3 are driven by the Big4 frims, I 
performed two additional tests using mixed effect models. First, I removed the Big4 
observations and re-ran the models (n=308), the results hold. The coefficient on COP is 
0.10 with a t-statistic of 3.312, on Trust is 0.10 with a t-statistic of 3.543, and on CS is 
0.47 with a t-statistic of 4.408. In the second test, I replaced the indicator Top100 with an 
indicator Big4, which equals to one when an auditor is a Big4. The results indicate that 
Big4 does not significantly predict the dependent variables (p>0.05). The additional 
analysis shows that the results were not driven by the Big4 accounting firms. 
As mentioned earlier in the sample selection section, I removed 38 proposals from 
the primary analyses because they were submitted to multiple engagements and thus may 
introduce noise. In the following untabulated supplemental tests, I included those 
proposals in the sample (n=370) and ran the analyses to test my hypotheses. First, paired 
samples tests indicate that the mean value of INDP is significantly different from that of 
COP (t = -15.68; p<0.01), Trust (t = -11.35; p<0.01), and CS (t = -41.13; p<0.01), which 
are consistent with the result from a one-way ANOVA contrast test (t = 41.53; p<0.01). 
The supplemental results also support H1. Second, results from mixed effect models 
indicate that Top100 is positively associated with the relationship marketing measures 
and thus support H3: COP (coefficient = 0.09; p<0.01), Trust (coefficient = 0.09; p<0.01), 
19 In the multivariate test, the dependent variables include INDP, COP, Trust, and CS; the predictors 
include MgtInf, Top100, Fees, EngSize, and WC.  
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and CS coefficient = 0.45; p<0.01). However, the mixed model results do not show a 
significant positive association between INDP and MgtInf (coefficient = 0.04; p = 0.311). 
A possible reason is that all of the 38 proposals are in the non-management involvement 
group; the inclusion of those proposals in the sample increases the proportion of the non-
management involvement group (i.e., to 75%) and consequently distorts the results. 
2.6. Discussion, Limitations, and Summary 
This study examines auditors’ marketing communications and impression 
management strategies by investigating audit proposals and finds that CPA firms project 
certain desirable images to their clients. Specifically, the firms highlight an image of a 
cooperative, trustworthy service provider over an image of independent, objective auditor 
in their proposals. The study results are consistent with prior findings. Zeff (2003) 
suggests that auditors, while driven by their financial incentives, commit to meet clients’ 
desirability and preference; Fontaine and Pilote (2012) find that audit clients prefer a 
cooperative, trusting, and long-term relationship with their auditors. In addition, auditors’ 
inherent self-serving biases, as suggested by Bazerman et al. (1997), can explain why 
auditor independence can be vulnerable in a contracting process with a client. 
Importantly, the study responds to a recent concern raised by the PCAOB about audit 
firms’ marketing materials (PCAOB 2013). The board argues that a firm, while driven by 
its commercial considerations, could use marketing language that is at odds with audit 
quality and independence. Although the current study does not provide direct evidence 
linking a firm’s marketing strategies with an actual impairment of auditor independence, 
the findings indicate that CPA firms’ audit proposals contain extensive marketing 
language, which may not support or advance auditor independence in appearance. 
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The study also investigates whether client management’s influence on auditor 
selection affects a CPA firm’s impression management strategies in a RFP process. The 
degree of client management’s involvement in an audit procurement process varies from 
state to state: in some states, the client management can weigh in during the evaluation 
process of selecting an external auditor, but in others, they do not. Consistent with 
Fiolleau’s et al. (2013) findings, this study suggest that auditors in a RFP process 
strategically project different personae that respond to the decision makers' needs and 
preferences. The results indicate that CPA firms portray more independence in the 
proposals when management is involved in a selection process, as compared to when an 
independent state agency is responsible to select the auditor. One possible explanation is 
that managerial influence over auditor selection is believed to affect auditor 
independence negatively (e.g., Carcello and Neal 2000, 2003); as a result, the issue of 
auditor independence would attract more attention in a RFP process when client 
management is involved in auditor selection decisions than when client management is 
not. Consequently, to eliminate the concern about an impairment of auditor independence, 
CPA firms are likely to emphasize the value of objectivity and portray more 
independence in their proposals.  
In addition, as mentioned earlier, Wilson and Stewart (1990) provide an 
alternative explanation of why a governmental auditee is incentivized to demand 
independent auditors and a high quality audit. They find that employment of an 
independent CPA firm auditor and the quality of municipal financial information are 
positively associated with increased competition in the primary market for new issues of 
general obligation bonds. This explanation seems possible because over 50% of the 
37 
government entities in this study sample issue municipal bonds, and the correlation 
between bond issuance and client management involvement is significantly positive 
(coefficient=0.16; p<0.01). 
Lastly, prior research suggests that increasing competition in the audit market 
provokes audit firms to adopt a marketing orientation and finds that audit firms undertake 
more market activities in the past decades (e.g., Broberg, Umans, and Gerlofstig 2013). 
This study further discovers that larger CPA firms engage in more relationship marketing 
strategies while communicating with a potential client than do smaller firms. In fact, the 
Big 4 audit firms spend significant resources in building and maintaining relationships 
with their clients (Dhaliwal, Lamoreaux, Lennox, and Mauler 2014). The findings imply 
that commercial considerations could drive CPA firms’ impression management and 
jeopardize perceived independence of CPA firms in a contracting process. It raises a 
concern whether those firms, while pursuing a close relationship with a client, develop an 
organizational culture emphasizing profit and commercial gain over professional 
independence and objectivity. 
The study findings are subject to a number of limitations. First, an inherent 
limitation of the linguistic approach (i.e., pure word counting based on customized 
dictionaries) is that it ignores important context and background knowledge (Larcker and 
Zakolyukina 2012). For example, simply counting words does not differentiate between 
several meanings of words with the same appearance in the text or categorize 
combinations of words or phrases that may imply different meanings from the constituent 
words. Second, an assumption of the study is that text analysis can capture a particular 
linguistic feature through a carefully developed dictionary. The dictionaries used in this 
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study are developed and customized to capture target words related to image attributes. 
The validity of the dictionaries can be subject to subjectivity if important dimensions are 
overlooked. It would raise a concern about whether the word categories contain a 
necessary set of words for business communication in audit proposals. To mitigate this 
concern, I recruited several accounting professionals from state audit agencies to review 
and validate the dictionaries used in the study. Third, the linguistic cues used to capture 
the study constructs are selected based on a review of the audit proposals in the sample. 
These audit proposals are submitted to governmental clients and thus may contain 
different information from those used in the private sector, which could limit the study’s 
ability of generalization. In addition, this study examines the audit proposals submitted 
for government audit engagements in 15 U.S. states. Some states provided more audit 
proposals than did others. State factors may drive the study results if the information 
contained in audit proposals is significantly different across states. To address this 
concern, I tested several characteristics of the in- and out-sample states and found no 
significant differences across the states. Even though, the study may not generalize to the 
omitted U.S. states or to the private sector. 
In spite of the limitations discussed above, the study contributes to the literature 
by creating a unique dataset of audit proposals and by developing and validating 
linguistic categories that capture auditor independence and relationship marketing 
language. The study also has important implications for regulators and practitioners. 
Responding to the PCAOB’s (2013) concern about CPA firms' marketing materials, the 
study examines the content of audit proposals for auditors’ marketing language and 
suggests that firms’ impression management strategies may be at odds with auditor 
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independence. The findings provide insight into why a firm’s assurance marketing 
materials should be monitored for its marketing language. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of Attributes 
Attributes Definition Source 
Independence The state of mind that allows an auditor to 
"act with integrity and exercise objectivity 
and professional skepticism."  
AICPA ET section 
100-01 
Cooperation Auditors' willingness to assist and 
mutually interact with clients to reach a 
common goal. 
Fontaine and Pilote 
(2012); 
Pinto and Pinto 
(1990)  
Trustworthy Auditors are reliable and willing to 
develop a long-term relationship with 
clients. 
Fontaine and Pilote 
(2012); 
Rennie, Kopp, and 
Lemon (2010); 
Morgan and Hunt 
(1994)  
Client Satisfaction   Client Satisfaction includes four 
dimensions: Responsiveness, Empathy 
(understanding), Value, and 
Effectiveness.   The definition of each 
dimension is listed below. 
• Responsiveness: auditors' ability to 
react and tailor their service to client 
needs; 
•  Empathy: the degree of auditors' 
understanding of the client's business 
challenges; 
• Value: auditors' ability to provide 
value-added services beyond the 
required audit; 
• Effectiveness: auditors' ability and 
commitment to complete the audit by 
indicated deadline 
Fontaine and Pilote 
(2012); Duff 
(2004, 2009); Payn
e and Jensen 
(2002); Carcello et 
al. (1992)  
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Table 2.2: Constructed Word Categories and Validity Statistics 
Category Abbreviation List of words* Alpha 
reliability 
(Binary/raw)** 
Independence INDP ethical; ethics; impartial; impartiality; 
independence; independent; neutral; 
neutrality; objective; objectivity; 
unbiased. 
0.483/0.13 
Cooperation COP assist; assistance; collaborate; 
collaboration; communicate; 
communicating; communication; 
cooperate; cooperated; cooperation; 
cooperative; cooperatively; coordinate; 
coordination; open; partner; partnering; 
teamwork; work-as-a-team; work-
together. 
0.649/0.1 
Trustworthy Trust accountability; commit; commitment; 
committed; confidence; confident; 
confidential; confidentiality; fair; 
fairly; fairness; honest; honestly; 
honesty; promise; promising; relation; 
relationship; relationships; reliability; 
reliable; trust; trusted; trustful; trusting; 
trustworthy. 
0.684/0.308 
Client 
Satisfaction 
CS accommodating; advice; advise; 
advisory; beneficial; benefit; consult; 
consultancy; consultant; consultation; 
consulting; counsel; effective; 
effectively; effectiveness; efficacy; 
empathy, enthusiasm; guidance; 
improve; improvement; need; needs; 
recommend; recommendation; 
responsive; responsiveness; 
satisfaction; satisfied; satisfy; serve; 
service; services; tailored; time; 
timeline; timely; timing; understanding; 
valuable; value. 
0.823/0.678 
Table 2.2 presents definitions of the linguistic-based variables that I use to estimate linear mixed models for 
auditor image attributes. This table provides the words listed for each category.  
* See the development of the word lists in Appendix A. 
** As suggested by the LIWC2007 Manual, the alpha reliability is calculated based on the binary and 
uncorrected methods. The binary method converts the usage of each of the single words within a given text 
into either a 0 (not used) or a 1 (used one or more times). The uncorrected method is based on the 
percentage of total words that each of the category words is used. 
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Table 2.3: Sample of Audit Proposals by States 
State Number of 
engagements 
Number of audit 
proposals (Top100) 
Number of CPA 
firms (Top100) 
Colorado 19 82 (62) 17 (10) 
Illinois 19 56 (32) 20 (9) 
Indiana 2 10 (2) 10 (2) 
Kansas 4 14 (9) 7 (5) 
Kentucky* 40 40 (6) 27 (1) 
Michigan  1 7 (3) 7 (3) 
North Carolina 9 42 (30) 18 (11) 
North Dakota 2 4 (4) 2 (2) 
New Hampshire 1 2 (2) 2 (2) 
New Jersey 2 6 (2) 6 (2) 
Ohio 12 57 (5) 19 (4) 
Oklahoma 4 20 (6) 11 (4) 
Vermont 2 5 (3) 5 (3) 
Virginia 5 31 (16) 15 (7) 
Wyoming 1 2 (1) 2 (1) 
TOTAL 123 378 (183) 133**(32) 
*In Kentucky, CPA firms are allowed to submit one proposal for multiple engagements. For the 2010 and 
2012 audit procurement, the Kentucky Auditors of Public Accounts contracted out the audits for 40 
counties. Each engagement received an average of eight proposals that were also submitted to other 
engagements. 
** There are 133 CPA firms in the sample. The column total is greater than 133 because some CPA firms 
participate in governmental audit procurement practices in multiple states. 
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Table 2.4: Sample Characteristics 
Total audit proposals  378  
Real estate audit  (  8)  
  370  
KY proposals  38  
  332  
Missing fee data  44  
Proposals without missing 
values 
 288  
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics for Linguistic and Control Variablesa 
  Mean Std. Dev Min Max 25th 50th 75th Skew Kurtosis 
Panel A: Entire Sample (N=332) 
      
INDP .17 .10 .00 .54 .09 .16 .23 .73 .51 
COP .37 .18 .00 1.19 .23 .34 .48 .69 .86 
Trust .29 .15 .00 1.05 .20 .28 .38 1.03 2.87 
CS 1.56 .61 .45 3.59 1.04 1.51 1.94 .58 -.10 
affect 2.78 .73 1.23 5.51 2.31 2.72 3.27 .54 .41 
posemo 2.36 .60 1.22 4.51 1.93 2.32 2.73 .65 .53 
negemo .39 .33 .00 2.08 .16 .27 .57 1.60 3.46 
Fees $395,955 903,048 12,450 6,437,721 50,550 105,443 259,375 3.91  16.31  
EngSize 1,187 5,379 .72 55,000 7.89 67.15 492.03 9.23 90.03 
WC 6,679 5,570 654 37,664 3,765 5,543 7,285 3.17 12.23 
Panel B: Transformation 
INDP_W .17 .10 .00 .37 .09 .16 .23 .38 -.58 
COP_W .36 .16 .00 .69 .23 .34 .48 .28 -.72 
Trust_W .29 .13 .00 .54 .20 .28 .38 .06 -.46 
CS_W 1.55 .59 .45 2.77 1.04 1.51 1.94 .40 -.61 
Affect_W 2.76 .69 1.23 4.12 2.31 2.72 3.27 .20 -.59 
Posemo_W 2.34 .55 1.22 3.50 1.93 2.32 2.73 .27 -.52 
Negmo_W .37 .27 .00 .96 .16 .27 .57 .74 -.58 
Fees_ln 11.77 1.33 9.43 15.68 10.83 11.57 12.46 .79 .47 
EngSize_ln 4.26 2.56 -.33 10.92 2.07 4.21 6.20 .20 -.91 
WC_ln 8.57 .61 6.48 9.82 8.23 8.62 8.89 -.42 .95 
Panel C: Top100 CPA Sample (N=183) 
INDP_W .17 .09 .00 .37 .09 .16 .22 .63 -.18 
COP_W .43 .15 .09 .69 .30 .44 .54 .01 -.82 
Trust_W .32 .12 .08 .54 .24 .32 .40 .02 -.68 
CS_W 1.81 .55 .48 2.77 1.46 1.85 2.11 -.07 -.39 
Affect_W 2.90 .69 1.49 4.12 2.40 2.85 3.44 .14 -.85 
Posemo_W 2.51 .51 1.33 3.50 2.15 2.48 2.86 .07 -.38 
Negmo_W .36 .27 .03 .96 .16 .24 .55 .94 -.21 
Fees $555,279  1,124,263 15,700  6,437,721  55,000  149,440  366,640  3.01  9.06  
EngSize $1,953  7,123  1  55,000  15  396  1,125  6.93  46.99 
WC 7,652  6,321  1,141  37,119  4,355  5,900  8,130  2.83 8.48 
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Table 2.5 (continued) 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 25th 50th  75th Skew Kurtosis 
Panel D: Non-Top100 CPA Sample (N=149) 
    
INDP_W 0.17 0.11 0.00 0.37 0.07 0.16 0.25 0.18 -0.88 
COP_W 0.28 0.14 0.00 0.69 0.18 0.25 0.36 0.79 0.54 
Trust_W 0.24 0.13 0.00 0.54 0.17 0.22 0.32 0.30 -0.05 
CS_W 1.22 0.44 0.45 2.77 0.94 1.09 1.47 1.11 1.41 
Affect_W 2.59 0.64 1.23 4.12 2.08 2.61 3.00 0.20 -0.27 
Posemo_W 2.13 0.53 1.22 3.50 1.76 2.07 2.40 0.71 0.14 
Negmo_W 0.39 0.28 0.00 0.96 0.16 0.32 0.61 0.53 -0.88 
Fees $188,197 399,109 12,450 3,680,000 44,300 100,000 174,388 6.61 51.31 
EngSize 244.79 816.86 0.72 6,719.17 4.05 20.10 130.22 5.67 35.62 
WC 5,483 4,217 654 37,664 3,025 4,812 6,795 3.67 23.16 
Panel E: Management Involvement Sample (N=92) 
INDP_W 0.20 0.09 0.00 0.37 0.15 0.19 0.26 -0.05 0.24 
COP_W 0.31 0.15 0.00 0.69 0.19 0.26 0.38 0.99 0.58 
Trust_W 0.26 0.11 0.00 0.54 0.20 0.24 0.34 -0.13 0.52 
CS_W 1.29 0.48 0.61 2.77 0.95 1.15 1.46 1.50 2.16 
Affect_W 2.95 0.57 1.85 4.12 2.56 2.86 3.27 0.39 -0.29 
Posemo_W 2.29 0.56 1.36 3.50 1.84 2.19 2.58 0.80 -0.09 
Negmo_W 0.56 0.27 0.00 0.96 0.33 0.55 0.80 -0.07 -1.09 
Fees $486,887 1,135,227 14,400 6,437,721 87,900 128,655 272,345 3.79 14.20 
EngSize 387 1,112 1.81 5,017 7.89 21.80 130.22 3.60 11.95 
WC 7,462 6,761 654 37,664 3,821 6,033 8,140 2.81 8.89 
Panel F: Non-Management Involvement Sample (N=240) 
INDP_W 0.15 0.10 0.00 0.37 0.07 0.14 0.21 0.61 -0.41 
COP_W 0.38 0.17 0.00 0.69 0.25 0.38 0.51 0.04 -0.75 
Trust_W 0.30 0.13 0.00 0.54 0.20 0.30 0.39 0.01 -0.72 
CS_W 1.65 0.59 0.45 2.77 1.19 1.70 1.97 0.08 -0.66 
Affect_W 2.69 0.71 1.23 4.12 2.13 2.60 3.26 0.27 -0.69 
Posemo_W 2.36 0.55 1.22 3.50 1.99 2.36 2.76 0.07 -0.57 
Negmo_W 0.30 0.24 0.00 0.96 0.13 0.21 0.44 1.20 0.69 
Fees $353,951 772,489 12,450 4,737,961 41,950 83,800 257,750 3.55 12.69 
EngSize 1,487 6,248 0.72 55,000 5.47 108.40 630.44 7.98 66.24 
WC 6,378 5,024 949 37,119 3,691 5,261 6,977 3.28 13.78 
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Table 2.5 (continued) 
a Variable Definitions: 
INDP = Self-constructed category of independence. For the definition and the complete 
list of words, see Table 2.1 and 2.2. Simple count of matched words in the 
category divided by the number of total words ignoring articles in a given 
proposal. 
COP = Self-constructed category of cooperation. For the definition and the complete 
list of words, see Table 2.1 and 2.2. Simple count of matched words in the 
category divided by the number of total words ignoring articles in a given 
proposal. 
Trust = Self-constructed category of trust. For the definition and the complete list of 
words, see Table 2.1 and 2.2. Simple count of matched words divided in the 
category by the number of total words ignoring articles in a given proposal. 
CS = Self-constructed category of client satisfaction. For the definition and the 
complete list of words, see Table 2.1 and 2.2. Simple count of matched words 
in the category divided by the number of total words ignoring articles in a 
given proposal. 
affect = LIWC default category capturing psychological affective processes. Simple 
count divided by the number of words ignoring articles. 
posemo = Positive affect. Simple count divided by the number of words ignoring articles. 
negemo = Negative affect. Simple count divided by the number of words ignoring 
articles. 
Fees = Proposed audit fee per audit proposal. 
EngSize = Auditee’s operating expenses (in millions) in the prior year.  
WC = Raw number of words per audit proposal 
Variable_W = Winsorized value of the variable 
Variable_ln = Natural logarithm value of the variable 
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Table 2.6: Cross-Correlation Matrixa 
 
MgtInf Top100 INDP COP Trust CS Fees EngSize WC 
MgtInf 1.000** -.494** .286** -.228** -.155** -.288** .165** -.257** .061** 
Top100 -.494** 1.000** .029** .486** .330** .537** .161** .382** .232** 
INDP .270** .037** 1.000** .095** .272** .252** -.005** .043** .147** 
COP -.220** .470** .078** 1.000** .396** .587** .006** .252** -.061** 
Trust -.167** .319** .275** .371** 1.000** .514** -.089** .116** -.103** 
CS -.276** .517** .224** .562** .494** 1.000** -.089** .178** -.133** 
Fees .134** .199** .035** .002** -.077** -.092** 1.000** .609** .344** 
EngSize -.237** .374** .049** .221** .086** .123** .652** 1.000** .268** 
WC -.004** .283** .151** -.015** -.038** -.107** .402** .320** 1.000** 
a This table provides correlations among the variables used in subsequent tests. Spearman 
(Pearson) correlations are above (below) the diagonal. 
**,* Indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
Variable Definitions: 
MgtInf = 1 if client management helps to select the auditor, and 0 otherwise; 
Top100 = 1 if the audit firm is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting Today, and 
0 otherwise; 
INDP = Self-constructed category of independence. Simple count of matched words in 
the category divided by the number of total words ignoring articles in a given 
proposal. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
COP = Self-constructed category of cooperation. Simple count of matched words in 
the category divided by the number of total words ignoring articles in a given 
proposal. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
Trust = Self-constructed category of trust. Simple count of matched words in the 
category divided by the number of total words ignoring articles in a given 
proposal. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
CS = Self-constructed category of client satisfaction. Simple count of matched 
words in the category divided by the number of total words ignoring articles 
in a given proposal. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% 
percentile. 
Fees = Natural logarithm of proposed audit fees; 
EngSize = Natural logarithm of auditee’s operating expenses (in millions) in the prior 
year.  
WC = Natural logarithm of winsorized word count per audit proposal 
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Table 2.7: Paired Sample T-Test 
             Pair Differences 
 
 
  Mean Std. Deviation          t 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Panel A: N=332 
Pair 1 INDP - COP -.20 .19 -18.99 .000 
Pair 2 INDP - Trust -.12 .14 -15.57 .000 
Pair 3 INDP - CS -1.38 .58 -43.72 .000 
Panel B: N=288 
Pair 1 INDP - COP -.20 .19 -18.64 .000 
Pair 2 INDP - Trust -.13 .14 -15.79 .000 
Pair 3 INDP - CS -1.39 .60 -39.36 .000 
Variable Definitions: 
INDP = Self-constructed category of independence. Simple count of matched words 
divided by the number of total words ignoring articles in a given proposal. The 
data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
COP = Self-constructed category of cooperation. Simple count of matched words 
divided by the number of total words ignoring articles in a given proposal. The 
data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
Trust = Self-constructed category of trust. Simple count of matched words divided by 
the number of total words ignoring articles in a given proposal. The data is 
transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
CS = Self-constructed category of client satisfaction. Simple count of matched words 
divided by the number of total words ignoring articles in a given proposal. The 
data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
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Table 2.8: Results From Linear Mixed Effect Models 
Panel A: Estimates of Fixed Effects 
DV        INDP___ ___ _ COP__ _ ____Trust__ _ _____CS____ 
Column (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 
N=332 
N=332 
MI 
N=332 
N=332 
MI 
N=332 
N=332 
MI 
N=332 
N=332 
MI 
 
Parameter 
β 
p-value 
β 
p-value 
β 
p-value 
β 
p-value 
β 
p-value 
β 
p-value 
β 
p-value 
β 
p-value 
Intercept -0.100 -2.93 0.41 -0.75 0.42 -2.66 2.24 0.95 
 
(0.239) (0.003) (0.009) (0.451) (0.002) (0.008) (0.000) (0.340) 
MgtInf 0.060 2.50 0.03 -0.06 0.01 0.20 -0.06 -0.58 
 
(0.034) (0.012) (0.604) (0.950) (0.697) (0.843) (0.794) (0.561) 
Top100 0.010 0.04 0.10 3.15 0.10 3.01 0.47 4.25 
 
(0.549) (0.971) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fees -0.010 0.03 -0.01 0.91 0.00 -0.72 -0.01 -0.70 
 
(0.206) (0.974) (0.566) (0.365) (0.587) (0.474) (0.683) (0.484) 
EngSize -0.000 -0.48 0.00 -0.55 0.00 -0.94 0.01 -0.07 
 
(0.836) (0.633) (0.496) (0.583) (0.508) (0.351) (0.624) (0.947) 
WC 0.040 3.29 -0.01 0.99 -0.02 3.11 -0.11 -0.37 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.477) (0.318) (0.249) (0.002) (0.012) (0.715) 
Panel B: Estimates of Covariance Parameters 
 
       INDP___ ___ _ COP__ _ ____Trust__ _ _____CS____ 
Column (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
Parameter N=332 N=332 
MI 
N=332 N=332 
MI 
N=332 N=332 
MI 
N=332 N=332 
MI 
Residual 0.002** 0.003** 0.007** 0.007** 0.006** 0.006** 0.050** 0.052** 
EngRC 
(StateRC) 0.000** 0.000** 0.003** 0.002** 0.001** 0.001** 0.004** 0.005** 
StateRC 0.001** 0.002** 0.004** 0.004** 0.001** 0.001** 0.120** 0.116** 
FirmRC 0.006** 0.006** 0.008** 0.009** 0.009** 0.008** 0.150** 0.157** 
**,* Indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.8 (continued) 
Variable Definitions: 
DV:   
INDP = Simple count of words related to independence divided by the number of words 
ignoring articles. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
COP = Simple count of words related to cooperation divided by the number of words 
ignoring articles. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
Trust = Simple count of words related to trust divided by the number of words ignoring 
articles. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
CS = Simple count of words related to client satisfaction divided by the number of 
words ignoring articles. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% 
percentile. 
Predictors:   
MgtInf = 1 if client management helps to select the auditor, and 0 otherwise; 
Top100 = 1 if the audit firm is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting Today, and 0 
otherwise; 
Fees = Natural logarithm of proposed audit fees; 
EngSize = Natural logarithm of auditee’s operating expenses (in millions) in the prior 
year.  
WC = Natural logarithm of raw number of words per audit proposal 
EngRC = Recording engagement into a nominal scaled variable 
StateRC = Recording state into a nominal scaled variable 
FirmRC = Recording CPA firm into a nominal scaled variable 
Copyright © Yu-Tzu Chang 2015 
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Chapter 3 
Study 2: Auditor Selection and Perceived Audit Quality Attributes 
3.1.      Introduction 
Many U.S. state and local governments utilize external CPA firms for basic 
financial statement audits and single audits. Depending on the state, either a state audit 
agency or a government entity can issue a request for proposal (RFP) to solicit audit 
services. CPA firms can then respond by submitting audit proposals, which generally 
describe the qualification of the firm, background of the team members, audit plans and 
procedures, and estimated audit fees. Study 2 discusses audit procurement practices in the 
public sector and investigates the determinants of auditor choice in a government RFP 
process. Specifically, this study examines the following two research questions. First, do 
audit service quality attributes contained in audit proposals predict auditor selection in a 
RFP process, and if so, which attributes are most predictive of choice? Second, does 
political competition and the risk of corruption influence audit procurement quality? 
Governmental auditing is one cornerstone of good public sector governance 
(ALGA 2014). Auditors perform an especially important function in promoting 
credibility, equity, accountability, and appropriate behavior of public sector officials, 
while reducing the risk of public corruption (IIA 2012). More importantly, an effective 
governmental audit can increase citizens and stakeholders’ ability to evaluate and 
monitor public officials’ performance and thus instill confidence in government. 
Therefore, it is crucial that a governmental entity utilize a RFP process to hire a qualified 
auditor who provides a high quality audit. The General Accounting Office (GAO 1986) 
and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA 1987) deem well-
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designed audit procurement practices (e.g., the receipt of competitive proposals from 
prospective CPA firms) as a mechanism for ensuring audit quality. However, even 
though procurements for audit services are common in the public sector, few studies 
investigate how government clients select auditors. Moreover, political scandals 
involving high-level officials receiving payments from private companies awarded 
through government contracts illustrate that government officials hold considerable 
discretionary powers in awarding contracts, even with state regulation of the procurement 
process20. Thus, understanding audit procurement quality and the factors affecting the 
procurement quality is important to regulators, public officials, and the public. 
Product differentiation theory suggests that audit firms will highlight certain 
desirable attributes in their marketing materials in order to differentiate themselves from 
competitors and increase their attractiveness to prospective clients. Based on agency 
theory (e.g., Banker and Patton 1987), I hypothesize that, to mitigate agency problems, 
government clients will select an auditor who is perceived to provide good quality audit 
services. This study content analyzed audit proposals to examine whether linguistic cues 
related to three image attributes (independence, competence, and relationship marketing) 
along with other perceived audit quality attributes can predict auditor choice in a 
government RFP process. I used discrete choice models (e.g., Train 2007) to fit the data; 
the results indicate that descriptions of auditor’s competence in audit proposals have 
predictive power in auditor selection decisions in the public sector. In other words, 
auditors who highlight competence and qualification in their proposals are more likely to 
20 For example, Natividad Lara Cervantes, former U.S. Department of Defense contract supervisor, used his 
position and influence over millions of dollars in government contracts to extort over $100,000 in bribes 
from 2008 to 2011. In January 2014, Cervantes pledged guilty to charges involving bribery and kickbacks 
related to the awarding of construction and service contracts at Camp Pendleton (USA v. Cervantes, 2014). 
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be selected by government clients. Moreover, prior relationships between auditors and 
clients statistically significantly predict auditor selection. That is, government clients are 
inclined to hire a predecessor auditor in a RFP process. Environmental factors, political 
competition and perceived corruption risk, do not seem to affect auditor selection 
decisions or the quality of audit procurement practices.  
This study discusses governmental audit procurement processes, auditor selection 
procedures in a RFP process, and the factors influencing the effectiveness of audit 
procurement practices. The findings provide insights into the key attributes that affect 
auditor selection outcomes in the public sector. This paper contributes to auditing 
research in several ways. First, audit proposals are a key element in audit procurement 
practices; however, RFPs have received little attention in the literature21. The unique 
hand-collected dataset of the present study facilitates our understanding of governmental 
audit procurement practices and CPA firms' marketing communications. Second, this 
study expands the auditing literature in perceived audit quality. To date, research 
generally surveys audit clients' to assess their self-reported, perceived audit quality 
attributes (e.g., Schroeder, Solomom, and Vickrey 1986; Carcello et al. 1992; Duff 2009). 
This study examines audit firms’ marketing materials and investigates whether the 
linguistics cues reflecting perceived audit service qualities affect clients’ auditor selection 
decisions. The results inform practicing auditors by suggesting that government clients 
highly value auditors’ competence and that using language describing the auditor’s 
ability can influence clients’ choice of auditors. Lastly, this study employs emerging 
21 To my knowledge, there is one study investigating RFPs (Fiolleau et al 2013). In their study, the authors 
investigate how regulatory reforms designed to promote auditor independence may actually work in the 
context of auditor change. They examined seven RFP proposals in the private and public sector and 
reported data from only one private company. The current study collects 378 audit proposals and looks into 
the determinants of auditor selection decisions in the public sector. 
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corpus linguistic and text analytic methods to analyze audit proposals and reveal the 
implicit promises made by auditors to their public sector audit clients. This paper is 
among the first to create word categories that capture the promises made by auditors to 
their clients in RFPs. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides the study background and 
the supporting theories. Section 3.3 discusses the development of hypotheses, Section 3.4 
describes the methodology and the measurements of variables, and Section 3.5 provides 
descriptive statistics and analysis results. The summary of the study is provided at 
Section 3.6. 
3.2.      Background and Theory 
3.2.1.   Governmental Audits and Procurement Practices 
Governmental entities that expend $500,000 or more in federal awards are 
required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to comply with the audit and 
internal control requirements of Circular A-133 (OMB 2003). Governmental audits 
include audits performed under the Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996 and OMB 
Circular A-133, Audits of States, Local Governments and Non-Profit 
Organizations (referred to as single audits), program specific audits as defined under 
OMB Circular A-133, and other compliance audits and attestation engagements 
performed as required by federal, state, or local laws and regulations. Such audits for 
non-federal entities must be conducted by a public accountant or a government audit 
agency, which meets the general standards specified in generally accepted government 
auditing standards (GAGAS). 
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Federal outlays for grants to state and local governments increased from $91 
billion in fiscal year 1980 to about $606 billion in fiscal year 2011 (GAO 2012). 
Increases in federal grants to state and local governments invoke a variety of grant 
management challenges22 and raise the awareness about the importance of government 
audits (e.g., Deis and Giroux 1994; Saito and Mcintosh 2010). Failure to meet these grant 
management challenges may invite financial corruption and fraudulent activities in 
government agencies. In fact, corruption is a growing problem in the United States; for 
example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) lists public corruption as one of its 
top criminal investigative priorities (FBI 2010). In the past decade, numerous state and 
local officials were accused of bribery, extortion, and/or embezzlement; many pled guilty 
and were sentenced in prison. For example, Rita Crundwell, former Comptroller of the 
city of Dixon, Illinois, was indicted for committing perhaps the largest municipal fraud in 
U.S. history. She was sentenced to 19 years and 7 months in prison for allegedly 
embezzling as much as $54 million over 22 years and using the proceeds to finance her 
horse breeding business and lifestyle (Jenco 2012). Undoubtedly, the occurrence of 
political corruption manifests the importance of a quality audit of public resources. The 
GAO suggests that improving the single audit process as an effective accountability 
mechanism helps to address grant management challenges (GAO 2012). The Government 
Finance Officers Association (GFOA) argues that an effective government audit plays an 
essential role in signaling the integrity of the public financial management and disclosure 
and in enhancing taxpayers' confidence in elected officials (GFOA 2002). 
22 GAO (2012) grouped grants management challenges involving federal grants to state and local 
governments into five topic areas: (1) challenges related to effectively measuring grant performance, (2) 
uncoordinated grant program creation, (3) need for better collaboration, (4) internal control weaknesses, 
and (5) lack of agency or recipient capacity. 
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The GAO (1987) and the AICPA (1987) consider well-designed audit 
procurement practices as a mechanism for ensuring audit quality23. The GFOA (2002) 
also recommends that governmental entities undertake a competitive audit procurement 
process that emphasizes the auditor's competence to perform a quality audit as a 
determining factor in hiring. Furthermore, it is important to understand governmental 
entities' practices in auditor selection for the following two reasons. First, the risk of 
auditor moral hazard24 is perceived to be greater in the governmental environment 
because the probability of client financial failure and the subsequent threat of litigation 
are relatively low (Raman and Wilson 1994). Second, the GAO had issued two reports 
addressing CPA audit quality, which indicated that CPAs did not comply with 
professional auditing standards in many cases (GAO 1985; 1986). In a recent report, the 
GAO highlights the existence of continuing deficiencies in federal audits performed by 
CPA firms when compared to those performed by governmental auditors over the period 
2003-2004 (GAO 2007). An appropriately structured audit procurement practice, as 
suggested by the GFOA (2002), can reduce the frequency of audit deficiencies by 
screening out incompetent and unethical auditors. 
 Although the audit and internal control requirements of Circular A-133 hold for 
all U.S. states, considerable diversity exists across states in audit procurement policies, 
regulations, and procedures. According to the National Association of State Auditors, 
23 For example, a GAO study (1987) identifies several critical attributes for an effective procurement 
practice, which include the use of an effective solicitation process, the receipt of competitive bids from 
prospective CPA firms, the technical evaluation of proposals, the consideration of multi-year audit 
agreements, and the use of a written agreement documenting the expectations between the successful audit 
firm and the municipality. 
24 Moral hazard occurs under a type of information asymmetry where a risk-taking agent knows more about 
his/her intentions than the principal paying the consequences of the risk. Auditor moral hazard relates to 
auditors’ effort supply and/or truthful reporting (e.g., Dye, Balachandran, and Magee 1990; De and Sen 
1997). 
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Comptrollers and Treasurers (NASACT 2012), the state audit agency serves as the 
primary auditor of the basic financial statements in 34 states and the single audits in 13 
states. CPA firms conduct all basic financial statement audits in 11 states and the single 
audits in 10 states. In 26 states, the state auditor and CPA firms conduct the single audits 
jointly. The responsibility of selecting CPA firms goes to different parties across states. 
In 23 states, the state audit agency is fully responsible for initiating a RFP process to 
contract out the single audits; in all other states, the audited agency selects its own auditor. 
In the latter circumstance, the state audit agency may or may not be required to supervise 
or monitor the audit procurement process conducted by the individual audited agency25. 
Nevertheless, no matter which procurement procedure a state adopts, agency costs, just 
like in the private sector, should influence auditor selection decisions in the public sector 
(e.g., Bandyopadhyay and Kao 2010; Tate 2007). The next section reviews auditor 
selection and agency theory in the auditing literature. 
3.2.2.   Auditor Selection and Agency Theory 
The auditing literature often discusses demand and supply influences on auditor 
selection. From the demand side, the literature widely uses agency demand (e.g., Jensen 
and Meckling 1976; Francis and Wilson 1988), information demand (e.g., Elliott and 
Jacobson 1994; Moore and Ronen 1990), and insurance demand26 (e.g., Piot 2005) to 
explain the determinants of auditor choice in the commercial sector. However, for the 
following reasons this study does not consider information demand or insurance demand 
25 The state information is from a publication of the National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers 
and Treasurers: Auditing in the States: A Summary, 2012 Edition. 
26 Agency theory supports agency demand, which refers to a demand of principals and their agents for a 
quality audit as a monitoring device to enhance the reliability of accounting information and reduce agency 
costs. Information demand arises from information asymmetries, which refer to a demand for a quality 
audit that signals management's integrity and the credibility of financial statements to investors. Insurance 
demand refers to a demand of principals for a reputed auditor who offers extended collateral guarantees to 
indemnify investors and creditors against financial loss (i.e., auditors' deep pockets). 
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a great concern for auditor selection in the public sector. First, most, if not all, states have 
enforced transparency policies that require them to provide information about their 
operations and decisions online and readily available to the public. Government 
transparency mitigates information demand by reducing information asymmetry between 
governmental agencies and the public. For example, the data set (i.e., audit proposals) in 
this study was obtained through submitting open records requests to state audit agencies; 
a similar dataset, however, is not available from the private sector. Second, governmental 
agencies are less likely to experience a financial failure compared to public traded 
corporations. The governmental environment diminishes the insurance demand for 
auditing because the probability is relatively low of taxpayers suing auditors for damages 
or losses resulting from audit deficiencies. The subsequent threat of litigation to auditor is 
correspondingly reduced (Raman and Wilson 1994). 
On the other hand, as in the private sector, the principal-agent problem is 
prevalent in the public sector. Agency problems occur when the incentives or goals 
between the principal and the agent imperfectly align (i.e., conflicts of interest) and the 
principal cannot easily verify that the agent has behaved in the principal's best interests. 
Under these conditions, agency theory predicts that agents may not act upon the best 
interest of principals. Researchers (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Francis and Wilson 
1988) have used agency theory to explain corporations' selection of auditors (i.e., a 
demand perspective) in the private sector. Agency theory predicts that misaligned 
incentives between shareholders and managers will result in higher agency costs, 
especially in corporations where managers have a relatively low level of share ownership 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). The theory further suggests that the selection of auditors 
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signals management's integrity and that audit services function as monitoring devices to 
increase the credibility and the reliability of management and accounting information 
(Dopuch and Simunic 1982).  That is, agency problems induce a need for an independent 
audit (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Wallace 2004); companies with lower 
management shareholding should demand a higher quality audit to reduce agency costs 
from self-serving management (e.g., Firth and Smith 1992; Hope, Langli, and Thomas 
2012) compared to companies with higher management shareholding (e.g., family-owned 
business). 
In the public sector, Banker and Patton (1987) propose that agency theory can 
help explain municipal audit practices, relationships between citizens and elected 
officials, and the role of state auditors versus external auditors. Agency theory suggests 
that the principal-agent problem exists when the incentives of government officials are 
misaligned with those of the public. Government officials may not act upon the best 
interest of the principals when conflicts of interest occur. The Crundwell case mentioned 
earlier is a good example demonstrating the conflicts of interest between the principal 
and the agent in the public sector. Raman and Wilson (1994) believe that audits of 
governmental entities help control the agency problem with respect to the actions of 
public officials. Although some argue that the agency theory characterization of 
politicians and their constituents imperfectly maps from the profit sector, Wallace (2004) 
point out that, due to the attributes of political markets, commitments to monitoring 
activities (i.e., agency demand) by the incumbent can avert political competition.  
To summarize, this study considers agency demand as a determinant of auditor 
choice and uses agency theory to develop the study hypothesis. Because audit 
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procurement involves both a demand and supply side, the next section discusses audit 
services from a supply perspective by reviewing product differentiation theory, which 
supports the hypothesis that differentiated audit quality attributes are valued by audit 
purchasers. 
3.2.3.   Product Differentiation Theory 
Dickson and Ginter (1987, p. 6) define product differentiation as “offering a 
product that is perceived to differ from the competing products on at least one element of 
a vector of physical and nonphysical product characteristics.” An inevitable premise of 
product positioning is to meet client differentiation demand (Chen and Zhu 2009). 
Product positioning refers to a process through which marketers attempt to communicate 
their products’ attributes to target customers and create a distinct impression in the 
customers’ mind (e.g., Lamb 2012). In auditing, the product differentiation hypothesis 
traces to Dopuch and Simunic (1982) and DeAngelo (1981) whose studies suggest 
demands for different levels of audit quality. This stream of research often investigates 
the effect of audit-firm and individual auditor characteristics on audit quality and auditor 
choice. The arguments of the studies often refer to agency costs, which are widely used to 
explain demand for quality-differentiated audits (Watts and Zimmerman 1983). Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) proposes that clients’ demand for audit quality arises from the 
incentives to reduce agency costs they faced. Therefore, differential agency costs across 
firms or even for a given firm across time may invoke heterogeneous demands for audit 
services in terms of quality (DeAngelo 1981). Many studies using data from different 
countries (e.g., U.S., France, UK, China, Canada, etc.) in support of the claim that agency 
costs explain the choice of audit quality (e.g., DeFond 1992; Francis, Richard, and 
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Vanstraelen 2009; Khalil, Magnan, and Cohen 2008; Lennox 2005; Wang, Wong, and 
Xia 2008). 
The auditing literature provides empirical evidence on the existence of audit 
quality differentiation in audit markets. Although the empirical results for audit price 
differentials are mixed27, research generally supports product differentiation by 
evidencing the Big N price premium in audit markets28. In addition, research suggests 
that audit services are quality differentiated in terms of audit firm size. For example, 
DeAngelo (1981) suggests that audit quality partially depends on auditor firm size and 
that large audit firms are perceived as higher quality suppliers. Francis and Yu (2009) 
further provide evidence that larger Big 4 offices produce higher quality audits. 
Numerous studies support the association between firm size and a variety of audit-quality 
proxies (e.g. Krishnan and Schauer 2000; Khurana and Raman 2004; Geiger and Rama 
2006; Behn, Choi, and Kang 2008). An explanation for this association is that larger audit 
firms are motivated to perform high-quality audits as their reputations are more valuable 
(DeAngelo 1981). In fact, auditor reputation also differentiates audit firms. For example, 
the GAO (2003) reports that reputation is a key factor in managers' choices of auditor. 
Barton (2005) further provides evidence that firms build and preserve their reputations 
for credible financial reporting by engaging highly reputable auditors. 
Audit clients and capital markets also view industry expertise as an indicator of 
differential audit quality. A number of studies support the assertion that firm-level 
27 For example, Simunic (1980) found no significant differences in prices throughout the large and small 
segments of the U.S. market, and Chaney et al. (2004) find that there is no Big N premium when they 
control for self-selection bias. 
28 This stream of research uses data from various countries, including the U.S. (e.g., Palmrose 1986; Simon 
and Francis 1988), the United Kingdom (e.g., Chan, Ezzamel, and Gwilliam 1993), Australian (Francis 
1984; Francis and Stokes 1986), Japan (Taylor 1997), and Hong Kong (e.g., Simon, Teo, and Trompeter 
1992; Gul 1999). 
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industry expertise produces higher quality audits (e.g., Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang 2003; 
Gramling and Stone 2001; Krishnan 2003, 2005). Recently, the focus of industry 
expertise has shifted from the firm to the office (e.g., Ferguson et al. 2003) or individual 
level (e.g., Carcello and Nagy 2004). Using data from Taiwan, Chin and Chi (2009) find 
that expertise at the individual level (i.e., signing partners) is positively associated with 
audit quality with respect to a likelihood of accounting restatements. Further, their 
evidence suggests that the differential restatement likelihood due to industry expertise is 
mainly attributable to partner-level, rather than firm-level, expertise. In a recent study, 
Zerni (2012) uses Swedish data to examine auditor specialization at the individual partner 
level; his findings, consistent with Chin and Chi’s, suggest that client firms infer audit 
quality at least partially from the specialization of the individual audit partner in charge. 
The studies discussed above support differentiation in audit quality using different 
quality proxies. The proxies were used because the credence attributes of auditing 
prevent an audit client from precisely observing how well an audit was performed 
(Causholli and Knechel 2012). For example, information asymmetry, a credence feature, 
makes it impractical, or impossible, for the client to directly assess audit quality prior to, 
during, and sometimes even after the audit. As a result, perceived quality attributes are 
used to signal audit service quality. The next section discusses several audit quality 
attributes from the perceptions of auditors, clients, and financial statement users. 
3.2.4.   Perceived Audit Quality Attributes 
One stream of auditing research uses survey data to discover attributes perceived 
to affect audit quality. Schroeder et al. (1986) argue that two types of factors, team-
specific characteristics and firm-wide characteristics, influence audit committee 
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chairpersons' ex ante appraisals of audit quality. Using a questionnaire, they examine 81 
audit committee chairpersons’ perceptions of the impact on audit quality of 15 attributes 
and find that audit team factors are perceived as more important than firm-wide factors. 
Expanding Schroeder's et al. work, Carcello et al. (1992) examine audit quality attribute 
perceptions of 245 audit partners, 264 preparers, and 120 financial statement users. 
Factor analysis reduces 41 quality attributes to 12 factors. The most important audit 
quality factors were: audit team and firm experience with the client, industry expertise, 
CPA firm responsiveness to client needs, and CPA firm compliance with general audit 
standards29. Due to changes in audit markets in the past decade (e.g., regulatory 
constraints, globalization of business, commercialization of practice), Duff (2004, 2009) 
revisits this issue of the perceptions of audit quality using data from the United Kingdom 
(UK). He develops a multidimensional, structured model of audit quality, AUDITQUAL, 
to capture the hypothesized dimensions of audit quality. AUDITQUAL consists of nine 
dimensions within four higher-order factors of competence (reputation, capability, and 
assurance), independence, relationships (expertise and experience) and service qualities 
(empathy, non-audit services, and responsiveness). Among those four higher-order 
factors, independence and competence have widely been recognized as two critical 
fundamental attributes of audit quality, which is consistent with DeAngelo’s (1981) 
definition of audit quality. She defines audit quality as a product of auditors' ability to 
discover (i.e., competence) and report (i.e., independence) a breach in clients' accounting 
system. 
29 The remaining 8 factors include CPA firm commitment to quality, CPA firm executive involvement, 
conduct of audit fieldwork, involvement of audit committee, individual team member characteristics, CPA 
firm personnel maintain skeptical attitude, CPA firm personnel maintain freshness of perspective, and 
degree of individual responsibility. 
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Other studies have examined client perceptions of the audit quality attributes 
associated with client satisfaction, auditor change, and auditor selection. For example, 
Beattie and Fearnley (1995) reveal fundamental aspects of the auditor choice process and 
explore audit clients' views of the desirability of audit firm characteristics (i.e., product 
differentiation from audit clients' perspective) based on questionnaire responses from 210 
listed UK companies. Their findings suggest that the technical competence of firm 
service is the most important characteristic to respondents, followed by the integrity of 
the firm and the quality of working relationship with audit partner(s). In addition, using 
factor analysis, they identify eight orthogonal audit firm dimensions30 of importance to 
audit clients. Their study provides empirical support for the arguments about differentials 
in audit quality (DeAngelo 1981), firm reputations and brand names (Dopuch and 
Simunic 1982), and specialist knowledge (Simunic and Stein 1987). Similar to Beattie 
and Fearnley (1995), Behn et al. (1997) and Iskandar et al. (2010) link several audit 
quality attributes31 to audit client satisfaction. The most recent work related to perceived 
audit quality attributes is Butcher's et al. (2013) study, which employs Duff's model to 
hypothesize and measure audit quality. They find evidence that the higher-order audit 
quality factors of relationship and service qualities are associated with auditor retention. 
30 Including reputation/quality, acceptability to third parties, value for money, ability to provide non-audit 
services, small audit firm, specialist industry knowledge, non-Big Six large audit firm, and geographical 
proximity. 
31 Analyzing survey responses from 434 controllers of Fortune 1000 companies, Behn et al (1997) find a 
significant, positive relationship between various audit quality attributes and client satisfaction, including 
responsiveness to client needs, executive involvement, effective and ongoing interaction with the audit 
committee, conduct of field work, industry expertise, etc. Using Malaysian data, Iskandar et al. (2010) 
found that client satisfaction is significant related audit firm quality attributes (i.e., prior experience, 
responsiveness, independence, and commitment of audit firm to quality audit) and audit team quality 
attributes (i.e., experience with client, independence, involvement in the engagement, conduct of field 
works, and ethical and knowledgeable of accounting and auditing standards). 
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The findings of the studies in audit quality attributes imply that dimensions of 
audit quality go beyond technical qualities32, to include features of service quality. This 
view is supported by a recent PCAOB discussion of audit quality indicators (AQI) and 
the development of an audit quality framework (PCAOB 2013). The framework defines 
AQIs as measures for three essential elements of audit quality: audit inputs, audit 
processes, and audit results. The Board believes that AQIs provide insight into financial 
statement audit quality and help audit clients and investors evaluate audit services at the 
engagement team and firm level. Sharing this perspective, the current study predicts that 
audit service quality attributes, which may lead to audit quality differentiation, will affect 
auditor selection in a RFP process in the public sector. The next section develops the 
study hypotheses. 
3.3.      Development of Hypotheses 
3.3.1.   Auditor Selection and Perceived Audit Service Qualities 
In audit procurement practices, a state audit agency (or a government entity) 
issues a request-for-proposal (RFP) to solicit audit services. Interested CPA firms then 
submit audit proposal to the audit agency. Product differentiation theory suggests that 
auditors, in response to clients' differential demands, will differentiate themselves from 
their competitors by highlighting their firm’s unique desirable attributes in their proposals. 
Fiolleau et al. (2013) provide direct evidence on audit product differentiation in an RFP 
process. They conduct a field study of an audit RFP in a public company; their findings 
suggest that factors (e.g., social relationship, organizational fit, proposed fee schedules) 
beyond technical expertise differentiated auditors bidding for the audit engagement. 
32 Technical qualities refer to traditional views of audit quality, centering on perceptions of auditor 
independence and competence. Duff (2009) proposes that service quality and technical quality are both 
necessary components of audit quality. 
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Therefore, I propose that CPA firms will highlight their perceived audit service quality 
attributes, in their proposals, to differentiate themselves from competing bidders. 
In the framework of agency theory, public officials are agents of the people, such 
as top corporate managers are agents of shareholders. For example, similar to 
management in the private sector, elected or appointed government officials are 
responsible to manage and operate public resources. Agency problems exist in the public 
sector when officials’ interests misalign with the public’s interests. In fact, agency 
problems could be more severe in the public sector because taxpayers, unlike 
shareholders in the commercial sector, cannot exit relationships with politicians right 
away but use their voting rights to monitor government programs and dismiss politicians. 
As agency theory suggests, a need to reduce agency costs may induce government 
officials to supply monitoring of their actions and performance. Audits of governmental 
entities should help control the agency problem with respect to the actions of public 
officials (Raman and Wilson 1994). Auditors perceived to provide quality services should 
be able to help government clients achieve accountability, improve operations, and instill 
confidence among citizens and stakeholders (IIA 2012). Therefore, I hypothesize that 
government officials will make their auditor selection decisions based on the evaluation 
of the quality attributes reflected in audit proposals.  
Based on the audit literature and Duff’s model of audit quality (2004, 2009), I 
identify several key service qualities and hypothesize that those attributes have predictive 
power in explaining auditor selection in a governmental RFP process. The quality 
attributes include independence, competence, marketing relationship (cooperation, trust, 
and client satisfaction as discussed in Study 1), firm reputation, team expertise, and 
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industry specialization. Independence and marketing relationship are as defined in 
Chapter 2 Table 2.1. Competence refers to an auditor’s understanding and knowledge that 
enables the auditor to render services with facility and acumen. Firm reputation refers to 
the brand name and the standing an auditor enjoys in the market as a reputational 
intermediary. As discussed earlier, studies examine auditor expertise at individual level 
and firm level. Expertise at the individual level refers to engagement team members’ 
relevant specialist knowledge and credentials. Expertise at the firm level refers to an audit 
firm’s industry focus, which can be captured by sales-based measures (e.g., Palmrose 
1986; Mayhew and Wilkins 2002) and/or a number-of-clients-based measure (Balsam et 
al. 2003). Although those attributes have potential impacts on audit quality, they are not 
audit results but quality elements of audit inputs and processes. In other words, the 
present study focuses on perceived audit quality factors, not proxies of actual (realized) 
audit quality. 
H1: Government clients will choose an auditor whose audit proposal reflects more 
perceived audit service qualities, including independence (H1a), relationship-marketing 
(H1b), competence (H1c), firm reputation (H1d), team expertise (H1e), and industry 
specialization (H1f). 
3.3.2.   Political Competition 
Although authorities recognize the merits of well-designed procurement policies 
and each state regulates its procurement process, political scandals (i.e., high-level 
officials received kickbacks from private companies awarded government contracts) 
illustrate that government officials sometimes hold considerable discretionary powers in 
the awarding of contracts. Yet, those discretionary powers may be mitigated by the 
degree of political competition in a state. In the U.S., political competition arises when 
both of the major parties compete in picking electoral platforms. In contrast, when one 
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party has a persistent electoral advantage that arises from a majority of committed voters, 
the dominant party faces low competition and thus has less incentive to appeal to swing 
marginal voters, who are uncommitted to any party (Besley, Persson, and Sturm 2010). 
That is, with higher political competition, incumbent political agents bear greater costs of 
breaching the agreements as the chance of losing future elections increases. As public 
officials' share of agency costs varies directly with expected political competition, Baber 
(1983) suggests that political competition motivates public officials to audit the 
disposition of public resources. He argues that in a scenario where interest groups (the 
principals) can influence the outcomes of elections, political entrepreneurs (the agents) 
advocate policies appealing to voters, and these two parties contract to share benefits 
accruing from public service. In such relationships, agency costs will arise when the 
agents have incentives to breach the agreements due to conflicts of interest between the 
parties. His findings reveal a positive correlation between state audit budgets and 
measures of political competition, which indicates that public officials have stronger 
incentives to supply auditing when they face higher political competition. That is, the 
intensity of political competition in a state can increase officials' demand for a higher 
quality audit. Therefore, I hypothesize that a government audit client in a state with 
higher political competition is more likely to engage in an effective audit procurement 
process. The effectiveness (quality) of an audit procurement process depends on whether 
the government client selects an auditor based on an evaluation of perceived quality 
attributes reflected in the audit proposals. 
H2: Compared to government audit clients in low political competition states, a 
government audit client in a high political competition state is more likely to select an 
auditor whose audit proposal reflects high quality attributes. 
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3.3.3.   Perceived Risk of Corruption 
As discussed above, the public sector has an agency problem when public 
officials put personal utility ahead of the public interest. Political corruption occurs as a 
result of the agency problem: public resources are used for the private interests of the 
agents instead of the need of the principals (Isaksen 2005). Political corruption, including 
embezzlement, nepotism, patronage, etc., refers to the violation of the common interest in 
favor of special interests that provide direct or indirect benefit to government officials or 
their patrons (Heidenheimer 1970). Motza (1983) and (Tanzi 1998) suggest that the most 
serious corruption is related to budgeting and financial management in the budget 
processes, including wasteful spending in launching unnecessary and unproductive public 
projects and overpaying for services or goods. A recent study also finds an impact of 
public officials’ corruption on the size and allocation of U.S. state spending (Liu and 
Mikesell 2014). The authors conclude that overall state spending was higher in more 
corrupt states than in less corrupt states and that corrupt public officials are likely to 
distort states’ public resource allocations in favor of items directly beneficial to 
themselves, such as capital, construction, borrowing, total salaries and wages, etc. 
Studies also find that public officials’ corruption has a negative impact on public 
procurement practices and management of public resources (e.g., Celentani and Ganuza 
2001; Hellman et al. 2000; Rose-Ackerman 1997). For example, corrupt officials can 
award projects to firms that are not the best quality (i.e., inefficient procurement 
decisions) in exchange for a bribe. As political scientists widely recognized the spreading 
nature of corruption (e.g., Jain 2001), I propose that corruption can also affect the 
effectiveness of the audit procurement process for two reasons. First, due to their self-
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interested motivation to maximize their personal gain, corrupt public officials are likely 
to overlook or override procurement policies and simply select an auditor whom they are 
friends with or can manipulate and control. Second, auditing provides a monitoring 
mechanism, and public sector auditors should objectively assess whether public officials 
manage public resources responsibly effectively, and help detect and deter public 
corruption (IIA 2012). Therefore, corrupt public officials are less likely to desire a quality 
audit than are their less corrupt counterparts. Based on the argument above, I hypothesize 
that a government agency is less motivated to support quality audit in a state where the 
perceived risk of corruption is high. 
H3: Compared to government audit clients in high corruption states, a government audit 
client in a low corruption state is more likely to select an auditor whose audit proposal 
reflects high quality attributes. 
To simplify the model, I assume there is no interaction effect between state 
political competition and corruption. The next section discusses the sample and data 
collection, the study method, and the measurements of variables used to test the 
hypotheses. 
3.4. Data and Method 
3.4.1    Sample and Data Collection 
The sample is constructed using a set of audit proposals submitted by CPA firms 
in a governmental RFP process. See details about the sample and data collection in 
Section 2.4.1. 
3.4.2.    Linguistic Methods 
Similar to Study 1, Study 2 utilizes LIWC to capture and count the occurrences of 
the words related to the constructs of interest (i.e., service quality attributes in audit 
proposals). The linguistic variables of interest in the current study relate to auditors’ 
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independence, relationship marketing, and competence. The first two attributes are 
defined in Study 1 Table 2.1; the third attribute is listed in Table 3.1, which provides the 
associated definition, the dictionary words, and associated internal reliability statistics. 
See discussions about the linguistic methods, dictionary development and validation, and 
procedures in Study 1 Section 2.4.2 and Appendix A. 
< Insert Table 3.1 here > 
3.4.3.   Discrete Choice Modeling 
This study examines the predictive power of several quality attributes in 
explaining auditor selection decisions in audit procurement practices. Government clients 
make a choice between two or more CPA firms who submit audit proposals; thus, each 
audit proposal represents a discrete choice in its corresponding choice set. Discrete 
choice modeling (DCM) attempts to analyze decision maker’s preferences amongst a set 
of alternatives (Train 2007). It is widely applied in marketing research to examine 
customer choice between products and services. Assuming decision makers to be utility 
maximizers, DCM identifies patterns in choices and models how different consumers 
respond to competing products. Therefore, a discrete choice model is more appropriate 
than a logistic regression model in the analysis of this study. 
3.4.3.1.   Model 1: Audit Service Quality Attributes and Auditor Selection 
Model 1 examines how audit quality attributes in proposals predict auditor choice 
in a RFP process (H1). The dependent variable, Winning, is a binary variable indicating 
whether an audit proposal is successful (i.e., the CPA firm was selected). Winning equals 
1 when an auditor receives a contract for an audit proposal. As there are only two 
possible outcomes for a bidding CPA firm ―success or failure― in a RFP process, the 
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dependent variable in this study has a Bernoulli distribution, in which n=1 (success) 
occurs with probability p and n=0 (failure) occurs with probability q=1- p. In this study, I 
modeled the probability of Winning as a function of several independent variables of 
interest including include INDP, COM, RM, Top100, ExpYr, and SPEC. The first three 
linguistic variables were measured by the percentage of the words related to the word 
categories of independence, competence, and relationship marketing (a combination 
dictionary of cooperation, trust, and client satisfaction). Top100, an indicator of whether 
an audit firm is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting Today, is a proxy for firm 
reputation. Team expertise, ExpYr, is measured as number of years of lead partner’s 
auditing experience. SPEC is an indicator for industry specialization.  
A proposed firm is considered a specialist in government audits if the firm 
reported in the audit proposal that it had audited similar governmental entities and/or 
provided a list of numerous audited government clients (i.e., a minimum of 10 
government clients in the past 5 years). Controlling variables include predecessor auditor 
(Prior), gender of audit engagement partners (Gender), geographic distance between 
auditor and client (Distance), and proposed audit fees (Fees). Prior equals to 1 if a 
proposed auditor was a predecessor auditor, which is included in the model to control for 
the prior relationship between auditor and client. Gender, measured as a percentage of 
female audit partners in the engagement, controls for the potential gender effect on 
auditor selection. Choi, Kim, Qiu, and Zang (2012) found an association between 
geographic proximity and audit quality. Therefore, the geographic distance between 
auditor and client was controlled in the selection model as I hypothesized that the 
government clients will select an auditor who is perceived to provide quality audit. 
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Following prior research (Choi et al. 2012), I measured Distance by taking into account 
the actual geographic distance between state auditor offices and the audit engagement 
offices. Specifically, I calculated the number of miles between the two locations using the 
zip code of the offices. Lastly, I controlled for audit fee and the length of audit proposals 
by including the variables, Fees and WC, in the model, which are measured as the natural 
logarithm of proposed audit fees and raw number of words in audit proposals.  Model 1 is 
as listed below: 
Winningij ~ Bernoulli (pij), pij ∈ {0, 1} 
logit(pij) = β0 + β1*INDPijk + β2*COMijk + β3*RMijk + β4*Top100k + β5*ExpYrijk + 
β6*SPECijk + β7*Priorijk + β8*Genderijk +β9* Distanceijk + β10*Feesijk + 
β11*WCijk 
where for state i, engagement j, and firm k: 
Winning = 1 if the proposal is a winning proposal, and 0 otherwise; 
INDP = simple count of the words related to the word category of Independence, 
divided by the number of words ignoring articles (wc);  
COM = simple count of the words related to the word category of Competence, 
divided by wc;  
RM = simple count of the words related to the word category of Cooperation, 
Trust, and Client Satisfaction, divided by wc;  
Top100 = 1 if the audit firm is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting Today, 
and 0 otherwise; 
ExpYr = number of years of lead audit partner’s auditing experience; 
SPEC = 1 if the firm is identified as a specialist in government auditing, and 0 
otherwise; 
Prior = 1 if the firm is the predecessor auditor, and 0 otherwise; 
Gender = % of female partners in the engagement; 
Distance = Natural logarithm of geographic distance (in miles) between auditor and 
client; 
Fees = Natural logarithm of proposed audit fees; and 
WC = Natural logarithm of raw number of words per audit proposal. 
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3.4.3.2.   Model 2 and 3: State’s Political Competition and Corruption Index 
Model 2 examines whether the between-state variations in political competition 
moderate the ability of the IVs identified in Model 1 to predict auditor choice (H2a). I 
adopted Klarner’s (2013) modified Ranney Index33 and computed the average of the 
2000-2010 data as the measurement for each state’s level of political competition (PC). 
The modified Ranney measures range from 0.5 to 1; higher values represent higher levels 
of competitiveness. PC is entered into Model 2 as a variable interacting with the IV’s of 
interest in Model 1. Considering the sample size and the statistical power of the model, I 
removed two control variables, Gender and Distance, from Model 2, which were not 
significant predictors in Model 1. Model 2 is specified as below. 
Winningij ~ Bernoulli (pij), pij ∈ [0, 1] 
logit(pij) = β0 + β1*INDPijk + β2*COMijk + β3*RMijk + β4*Top100k + β5*ExpYrijk + 
β6*SPECijk + β7*Priorijk + β8*Feesijk +β9*WCijk + β10*PCi + β11*INDPijk* 
PCi + β12*COMijk* PCi + β13*RMijk* PCi + β14*Top100k* PCi + β15*ExpYrijk* 
PCi + β16*SPECijk* PCi + β17*Priorijk* PCi + β18*Feesijk* PCi 
where for state i, engagement j, and firm k: 
PC = An average score of the 2000-2010 Modified Ranny index 
The definitions of the remaining variables are the same as described in Model 1. 
Model 3 examines whether the between-state variations in corruption moderate 
the ability of the IVs identified in Model 1 to predict auditor choice (H2b). I measured 
33 The original Ranney Index (Ranney 1976) measures a state's competition between the two major political 
parties in the United States for the time period of 1962-1973. The modified Ranney Index (Klarner, 2013) 
averages four components: proportion of state senators who are Democrats, proportion of state house 
members who are Democrats, proportion of the two-party vote that the Democratic candidate got in the last 
election, and an indicator for unified party control (0 = unified Republican control, 1 = unified Democratic 
control, .5=neither).  
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public corruption (COR) using the Corruption Risk Report Card34 released by the Center 
for Public Integrity (2012). The Center for Public Integrity primarily investigates three 
concepts: (1) the existence of public integrity mechanisms that promote public 
accountability and limit corruption, (2) the effectiveness of those mechanisms, and (3) the 
access that citizens have to those mechanisms. The report card examines the risk of 
corruption, not the level of actual corruption, in each state government. That is, a state 
with a higher integrity score in the report card has a lower level of perceived risk of 
corruption. Similar to Model 2, I interacted the variable COR with the IV’s of Model 1 in 
Model 3. Model 3 is specified as below. 
Winningij ~ Bernoulli (pij), pij ∈ [0, 1] 
logit(pij) = β0 + β1*INDPijk + β2*COMijk + β3*RMijk + β4*Top100k + β5*ExpYrijk + 
β6*SPECijk + β7*Priorijk + β8*Feesijk +β9*WCijk + β10*CORi + 
β11*INDPijk*CORi +  β12*COMijk*CORi + β13*RMijk*CORi + 
β14*Top100k*CORi + β15*ExpYrijk*CORi + β16*SPECijk*CORi + 
β17*Priorijk*CORi + β18*Feesijk*CORi 
where for state i, engagement j, and firm k: 
COR = Integrity score per Corruption Risk Report Card 
The definitions of the remaining variables are the same as described in Model 1. 
3.5. Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables are presented below, 
followed by the main results of hypotheses testing. 
 
34 States were graded on 330 statements about the laws and practices that promote open, accountable state 
government and deter corruption. These statements are used as Corruption Risk Indicators, which are 
grouped into 14 areas of state government oversight. Overall grades are based on the average grades in the 
major areas, and the reporting and research to score the indicators were conducted during the summer 2011. 
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3.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.2, Panel A reports descriptive statistics on the variables retrieved from the 
audit proposals and the interaction variables. The linguistic-based variables are measured 
as word percentages (percentage of matched words against the number of all words in a 
given proposal). The word categories, Independence (INDP), Competence (COM), and 
Relationship Marketing35 (RM), are constructed to capture auditors’ service quality 
attributes in audit proposals. Among these variables, the mean values suggest that CPA 
firms more frequently use words related to relationship marketing, followed by 
competence and independence, in audit proposals. The lead partners in the proposals have 
an average of 22 years working experience in auditing (ExpYr). The mean value of 
Gender indicates that there are more male partners than female partners in the proposals. 
The percentile measure of geographic distance (Distance) suggests that most of the 
proposed CPA firms are located near to clients (i.e., 75% of the firms are within 
approximate 100 miles away from clients). The average proposed audit fee is $395,955. 
The range of the proposed fees (Fees) is widespread: the lowest proposed fee is about 
$12,000 and the highest is about $6.4 million, which suggests high variability in the size 
and/or the complexity of the engagements in the sample. The percentile measure further 
indicates that the majority of proposed audit fees are relatively small (i.e., 75% of the 
sample is below $260,000). In fact, only 24 proposed fees are above $1 million. The 
political competition measure (PC) in the study has a mean value of 0.85, which is not 
statistically different from that of the 50 states (p=0.62) for the period from 2000 to 2010. 
It indicates that the states included in the study do not tend to have higher or lower levels 
35 The word category of Relationship Marketing is a combination dictionary of Cooperation, Trust, and 
Client Satisfaction as discussed in Study 1. 
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of political competition as compared to the out-of -sample states. The state integrity 
scores (COR) in the study have an average of 68.52 and range from 52 to 87, which are 
comparable to the 50 states’ scores with a mean of 68.22 and a range of 49 to 87. 
The normality tests (skewness and kurtosis) indicate that the variables, Distance, 
Fees, WC and COR are not normally distributed. For example, the distribution of 
Distance is highly skewed (Skewness = 6.247) with heavy tails (Kurtosis = 53.572). In 
addition, histograms of the variables, INDP, COM, Distance, Fees, WC, and COR, 
indicate outliers at the right end of the distributions. Therefore, before modeling, these 
variables are transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile and/or by taking natural 
logarithms. Panel B reports the transformed data. The skewness and kurtosis values 
indicate that the variables are normally distributed after transformation, which are then 
used in the subsequent analyses. Panels C and D present the descriptive statistics for the 
variables retrieved from the winning and unsuccessful proposals, respectively. The mean 
values of the proxies for auditors’ competency (COM and ExpYr) are slightly higher in 
the winning proposal group than those in the unsuccessful group. In addition, the mean 
value of the proposed audit fee is lower in the winning proposal group. Panels E and F 
present the composition of the sample by the existence of a prior relationship between 
auditor and client. An auditor is considered a predecessor auditor if the firm had served 
the client in the prior year(s) preceding the RFP. Compared to the non-predecessor group, 
predecessor auditors seem likely to state less INDP but more RM in their proposals, have 
more experiences (higher COM and ExpYr), propose a higher audit fees (higher Fees), 
and locate closer to the client (lower Distance). It is consistent with the expectation that a 
prior relationship between auditor and client would reduce auditor independence and 
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induce the auditor to emphasize on relationships between the parties. The lower proposed 
audit fees for the non-predecessor group suggests that auditors may charge less service 
fees (i.e., lowballing) to attract new clients.  
< Insert Table 3.2 here > 
Table 3.3 reports the correlations among the variables of interest. Winning is 
positively correlated with the indicator, Prior, for predecessor auditor. As suggested in 
Study 1, Top100 CPA firms are more likely to used words related to the relationship 
marketing (RM) attributes in their proposals. In addition, the positive correlations 
between Top100 and COM and SPEC indicate that those firms’ proposals emphasize 
auditors’ competence and industry specialization. Top100 also positively correlated with 
proposed audit fees (Fees), which is consistent with the literature in price premium in the 
audit market. The correlation results between PC and COR are mixed. Spearman 
correlation matrix indicates a positive association between these two variables, 
suggesting that a state with a higher political competition is perceived to be less corrupted. 
However, this positive association is not significant in the Pearson correlation matrix. I 
further ran statistical tests to examine multicollinearity of the variables. Collinearity 
diagnostics indicate that there is no multicollinearity among the IVs of INDP, COM, RM, 
ExpYr, Top100, Prior, SPEC, Fees, WC, PC, and COR (i.e., VIF<2.5 in all tests). 
< Insert Table 3.3 here > 
3.5.2.   Test of Hypotheses 
H1 predicts that government clients will choose an auditor whose audit proposal 
reflects more perceived audit service qualities. By fitting a discrete choice model to the 
dataset of auditor choices, I examined whether the following features have predictive 
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powers in explaining the auditor selection decision: independence (H1a), relationship-
marketing attributes (H1b), competence (H1c), firm reputation (H1d), team expertise 
(H1e), and industry specialization (H1f). Table 3.4 reports the results of three discrete 
choice models. In Column (1), the sample size is 288, which includes the data points that 
have proposed audit fee information36. Model 1a reports a significant result for 
competence (COM: coefficient = .957; p = .034), which suggests that a CPA firm is more 
likely to be selected if its audit proposal states more competence. Therefore, H1c is 
supported. However, as the remaining variables of interest are not significant, H1a, H1b, 
H1d, H1e, and H1f are not supported. Besides, the result for Prior is significant, which 
suggests that government clients are more likely to select a predecessor auditor if not 
prohibited by policies. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test, a statistical test for goodness of fit 
for logistic regression models, indicates that Model 1a has adequate fit and is correctly 
specified (p=.182). In addition, Nagelkerke’s Pseudo R2 suggests that the model explains 
roughly 16.5% of the variation in the outcome. 
Forty-four data points were removed from Model 1a due to missing fee data. The 
fee information is not available because in some states a cost proposal is not opened 
when a CPA firm’s technique proposal fails to pass the evaluation criteria and thus is 
disqualified from further evaluation. As Fees is not a significant predictor in Model 1a, I 
removed it from Model 1b and included the 44 data points for an analysis. As reported in 
Column (2), the sample size increased to 332 (288+44), and the results are consistent 
with those of Model 1a. Column (3) reported the results with imputed fee data. Multiple  
Imputation (MI) is a statistical technique that replaces each missing value with a set of 
36 See Sample Characteristics in Table 2.4. 
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plausible values that represent the uncertainty about the right value to impute (Rubin 
1987). Assuming the missing values are missing at random, I utilized MI to generate 
imputed data for the missing fee values, and the results of the five stimulated complete 
datasets are combined to produce pooled estimates as reported for Model 1c. The pooled 
results are consistent with those of Model 1a and 1b, except that Fees become significant 
in the imputed model. 
< Insert Table 3.4 here > 
H2 hypothesizes that a higher level of political competition in a state will increase 
a government client’s need for quality audit in that state. The prediction is that the 
coefficients of the interaction terms (e.g., PC*quality attribute) will be significantly 
positive. However, Model 2a in Table 3.5 reports no significant results for the interaction 
terms, which suggest that variations in the levels of the states’ political competition do 
not affect the effect of perceived audit service qualities on auditor selection decisions. 
Like Model 1b, Model 2b in Column (2) using the 332 data points reports the results 
consistent with those of Model 2a. The imputed datasets also report non-significant 
results (untabulated). Therefore, H2a is not supported. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test of 
goodness of fit indicates that Model 2a (b) has adequate fit (p>0.05). In addition, 
Nagelkerke’s Pseudo R2 suggests that the model explains roughly 21.3% (19.9%) of the 
variation in the outcome. 
H3 hypothesizes that a client in a state with a lower perceived corruption risk will 
be more likely to demand a high quality audit. The prediction is that the coefficients of 
the interaction terms (e.g., COR*quality attribute) will be significantly positive. However, 
Model 3a (n=288) and 3b (n=322) in Table 3.5 reports no significant results for all of the 
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interaction terms, except for COR*Prior (coefficient = -.169, p=.037; coefficient = -.216, 
p=.004). The negative coefficient indicates that government clients who are in a state 
with a lower level of perceived corruption risk are less likely to select a predecessor 
auditor, compared to those in the states with a higher level of perceived corruption risk. 
The overall results suggest that variations in the levels of the states’ perceived corruption 
risk do not affect the effect of perceived audit service qualities on auditor selection 
decisions. The imputed datasets also report consistent results (untabulated). Therefore, 
H3 is not supported. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test of goodness of fit indicates that Model 
3 has adequate fit (p>.05). In addition, Nagelkerke’s Pseudo R2 suggests that the model 
explains roughly 21.4% (21.3%) of the variation in the outcome. 
3.5.3.   Supplemental Analysis 
To address the potential issues associated with the nested structure of the proposal 
dataset, I ran generalized linear mixed models to test the study hypotheses. After 
controlling for the random effects of Engagement within State, State, and CPA firm, the 
mixed models report similar results as discrete choice models37. In Table 3.6 Panel A, the 
results for Model 1 indicate that auditor competence (COM: coefficient=0.17; p=0.04) 
and preexisting client-auditor relationships (Prior: coefficient=0.30; p<0.01) predict 
auditor selection decisions. Likewise, Model 2 in Table 3.6 Panel A reports no significant 
results for the interaction terms of political competition and perceived audit service 
qualities. Lastly, the results for Model 3 reported in Table 3.6 Panel A are similar to those 
reported by the discrete choice modeling: the interaction term, COR*Prior, also has a 
significant negative coefficient value. As discussed in Chapter 2, Panel B in Table 3.6 
37 I ran mixed effect models for both samples (n=288 and 332). The results for both samples are similar; the 
numbers reported in Table 3.6 are based on the sample of 332. 
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reports the parameter estimated for the random effects in the linear mixed models. The 
estimated parameters reported here indicate that both FirmRC and StateRC account for 
the variance of the random effects, but not significantly. 
Due to the small sample size and numerous predictors in the models, I used 
G*Power to estimate the archived power with a post hoc analysis. Based on an omnibus 
multiple regression power analysis, the statistical power of the models is adequate 
(>90%), given input parameters of a medium effect size, an alpha value of 0.05, a total 
sample size of 288, and 18 predictors. 
3.6.      Discussion, Limitations, and Summary 
This study examines audit proposals to reveal whether audit service quality 
attributes signaled in audit proposals explain government clients' selection of auditor. The 
results suggest that auditor competence predicts auditor selection in a government RFP 
process when the signals are embedded in the text of audit proposals (i.e., linguistic 
descriptions of auditor competence). There are no significant results for the measures of 
auditor competence in terms of the number of years of lead partners’ working experience 
in auditing and the number of government clients of an audit firm. The linguistic 
literature provides a possible explanation for the predictive power of the linguistic-based 
measure observed in this study. For example, Berry, Hiller, Mueller and Pennebaker 
(1997) examine the effect of individuals’ verbalizations on social perception38 of others. 
Specifically, they use LIWC to investigate the relations between individual differences in 
word selection and first impressions. They find that the language dimensions account for 
significant proportions of the variance in impressions of the individuals beyond that 
explained by nonlinguistic predictors (i.e., nonverbal expressiveness). Consistent with 
38 Refers to how people form impression of and make inferences about other people. 
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previous work on person perception (e.g., Feingold 1992), their findings indicate the 
linguistic dimensions are significant predictors of perceived competence. Moreover, 
some practitioners believe that words matter as much as numbers or even more in 
business because the words a company shares can fully express its underlying beliefs and 
cultures (e.g., Rittenhouse 2013; Williams 2013). To sum up, the linguistic category of 
auditor competence are likely to influence clients’ impressions of a firm and further 
affect their auditor selection decisions. 
The study also finds that government audit clients are more likely to hire a 
predecessor auditor, which suggests that they desire to have a long-term relationship with 
the auditor. This tendency may explain a non-significant result for auditor independence 
as studies generally suggest that ongoing auditor-client relationships make it difficult for 
auditors to maintain the appropriate level of independence (e.g., Church et al. 2015). 
Although the current study does not provide a conclusive finding on proposed audit fees 
(i.e., not significant in the original model but become significant in the imputed model), 
the negative coefficients in both models suggest that government audit clients would 
select a lower bidder. Lastly, there are no results indicating whether political competition 
and perceived risk of corruption would affect audit procurement quality in the public 
sector. A possible reason for the non-significant results is that both political competition 
and perceived risk of corruption are measured at a higher, broader level (i.e., statewide 
scope) and thus may not directly influence officials’ decision-making at a lower level, i.e., 
in their choices of auditors. 
In addition to the limitations of the linguistic approach discussed in Chapter 2, 
two caveats should be considered when evaluating the reported findings. First, the present 
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study does not measure audit clients’ perceptions of auditors’ service qualities based on 
their readings of audit proposals. In other words, there is no direct evidence that higher 
frequency of words related to a certain attribute is associated with (or cause) higher client 
perceptions of that attribute of an auditor. Therefore, the study cannot address the issue of 
causality between perceived audit service qualities and auditor selection decisions. 
Second, the study measures firm reputation with a dichotomized variable (i.e., whether a 
firm is recognized as a Top100 CPA firm or not), which likely results in information loss 
(Shinkins 2013). One can argue that the Big N audit firms are much more reputable than 
the rest of the Top100 CPA firms, and those non-Big N-Top100 CPA firms are not 
necessarily enjoy more reputation than non-Top100 CPA firms. Another measurement 
issues are related to the measure of perceived risk of corruption, which is calculated 
based on various components that may not be completely relevant to the audit 
procurement practices in question (e.g., state insurance commissions, lobbying disclosure, 
redistricting process, civil service management). The use of the imprecise measure may 
lead to unreliable estimates of the effect of corruption on audit procurement quality. 
To conclude, this study uses a textual analysis program, LIWC, to examine the 
associations between the linguistic cues related to perceived audit service attributes in 
audit proposals and governmental clients’ auditor selection decision. The study 
contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, the study results show a positive 
relation between a linguistic-based measure of auditor competence and auditor choice. 
This is consistent with a proposition that procurement practices in the public sector 
should inform a governmental client in selecting a competent supplier (Raman and 
Wilson 1994). Second, the results indicate that a prior client-auditor relationship is likely 
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to affect auditor selection outcome. Regulators should weigh the benefit of a close client-
auditor relationship (i.e., familiarity) against the related cost (i.e., loss in objectivity) in 
considering the need for mandatory auditor rotation. Lastly, the current study contributes 
by extending our understanding of the nature of an auditor proposal and its role in 
governmental audit procurement practices.
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Table 3.1: Constructed Word Categories and Validity Statistics 
Category 
(Abbreviation) 
Definition (Source) List of words* Alpha 
(Binary/ 
raw)** 
Competence 
(COM) 
“...is derived from a 
synthesis of education and 
experience." 
"Attainment and 
maintenance of a level of 
understanding and 
knowledge that enables a 
member to render services 
with facility and acumen.” 
(AICPA ET section 56 
Article V) 
 
ability; able; appropriate; 
appropriateness; capability; 
capable; capacity; certificate; 
certification; certified; 
competence; competency; 
competent; educated; 
education; educational; 
experience; experienced; 
expert; expertise;   
familiar; familiarity; 
knowledge; knowledgeable; 
license; licensed; profession; 
professional; proficiency; 
proficient; qualification; 
qualified; qualify; skill; 
skilled; skillful; specialist; 
specialize; specialty; 
sufficient; superior; train; 
trained; training. 
 
 
   0.765/  
   0.435  
* See the development of the word lists in Appendix A. 
** As suggested by the LIWC2007 Manual, the alpha reliability is calculated based on the binary and 
uncorrected methods. The binary method converts the usage of each of the single words within a given text 
into either a 0 (not used) or a 1 (used one or more times). The uncorrected method is based on the 
percentage of total words that each of the category words is used. 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 25th 50th 75th Skew Kurtosis 
 
Panel A: Entire Sample (N=288) 
INDP .167 .099 .000 .500 .090 .160 .230 .590 .321 
COM 1.402 .407 .610 3.170 1.123 1.370 1.650 .566 .898 
RM 2.221 .831 .610 4.560 1.490 2.115 2.800 .527 -.339 
ExpYr 22.420 7.598 3.000 44.000 16.000 20.000 29.000 .416 -.198 
Gender .258 .301 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .500 .774 -.318 
Distance 84.365 152.647 1.000 1667.000 5.500 45.550 106.000 6.247 53.572 
Fees $395,955 903,048 12,450 6,437,721 50,550 105,443 258,375 3.914 16.308 
WC 6,795 5,655 654 37,664 3,794 5,617 7,353 3.197 12.359 
PC .854 .037 .760 .930 .820 .860 .860 -.191 .922 
COR 68.531 5.324 52.000 87.000 66.000 67.000 74.000 .321 2.449 
Panel B: Transformation 
INDP_W .163 .091 .000 .340 .090 .160 .230 .182 -.770 
COM_W 1.390 .376 .610 2.110 1.123 1.370 1.650 .080 -.654 
Dist_ln 69.747 74.960 1.000 231.200 5.500 45.550 106.000 .966 -.427 
Fees_ln 11.766 1.328 9.429 15.678 10.831 11.566 12.462 .791 .466 
WC_Wln 8.587 .607 6.483 9.852 8.241 8.633 8.903 -.405 1.097 
COR_W 68.281 4.693 52.000 75.000 66.000 67.000 74.000 -.599 .854 
 
Panel C: Winning Proposal Sample (N=82) 
INDP .159 .102 .000 .430 .078 .150 .240 .504 -.266 
COM 1.468 .407 .620 3.170 1.208 1.385 1.658 1.096 2.896 
RM 2.165 .866 .950 4.560 1.475 2.000 2.733 .830 .356 
ExpYr 23.280 8.079 10.000 44.000 17.750 22.500 29.000 .464 -.174 
Gender .260 .313 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .500 .844 -.222 
Distance 80.794 98.219 1.000 548.000 5.800 47.550 112.000 2.139 6.478 
Fees $378,632  882,776  12,450  4,579,000  39,750  88,538  275,784  3.647 12.874 
WC 7,273  6,922  1,146  37,664  3,858  5,124  7,611  3.010 9.436 
  
Panel D: Unsuccessful Proposal Sample (N=206) 
INDP .170 .097 .000 .500 .100 .160 .230 .646 .618 
COM 1.376 .405 .610 2.760 1.070 1.355 1.658 .370 .012 
RM 2.243 .817 .610 4.230 1.505 2.190 2.838 .401 -.596 
ExpYr 22.078 7.391 3.000 44.000 16.000 20.000 29.000 .372 -.256 
Gender .257 .297 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .500 .746 -.350 
Distance 85.787 169.713 1.000 1667.000 5.250 44.100 101.500 6.203 48.649 
Fees $402,851  913,023  14,400  6,437,721  54,900  115,615  254,794  4.032 17.779 
WC 6,605  5,071  654  37,119  3,772  5,684  7,143  3.149 13.389 
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Table 3.2 (continued) 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 25th 50th 75th Skew Kurtosis 
Panel E: Predecessor Auditor Sample (N=62) 
INDP .151 .099 .000 .430 .070 .145 .210 .774 .144 
COM 1.454 .459 .670 3.170 1.158 1.425 1.703 1.048 2.246 
RM 2.232 .885 .610 4.510 1.565 2.105 2.823 .557 -.081 
ExpYr 23.048 7.867 10.000 40.000 17.750 21.500 28.250 .345 -.653 
Gender .274 .343 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .500 .919 -.296 
Distance 70.908 81.176 1.000 244.000 3.300 34.150 118.500 .910 -.726 
Fees 447,457  844,036  12,450  4,579,000  57,550  162,963  373,888  3.460 12.616 
WC 6,718  6,059  654  32,317  3,429  5,256  6,891  2.595 7.418 
Panel F: Non-Predecessor Auditor Sample (N=226) 
INDP .171 .098 .000 .500 .100 .160 .240 .553 .440 
COM 1.388 .391 .610 2.760 1.115 1.360 1.640 .323 .024 
RM 2.218 .817 .800 4.560 1.458 2.125 2.800 .518 -.421 
ExpYr 22.248 7.532 3.000 44.000 16.000 20.000 29.000 .436 -.036 
Gender .253 .289 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .500 .692 -.436 
Distance 88.057 166.948 1.000 1667.000 5.725 50.050 105.250 6.024 47.140 
Fees 381,826  919,859  14,400  6,437,721  48,844  97,663  224,588  4.033 17.270 
WC 6,816  5,553  795  37,664  3,878  5,624  7,523  3.425 14.412 
Variable Definitions: 
Winning = 1 if the auditor is awarded with a contract, and 0 otherwise; 
INDP = Self-constructed category of independence. Simple count divided by the number of words 
ignoring articles (%), winsorizing at 95%; 
COM = Self-constructed category of competence. Simple count divided by the number of words 
ignoring articles (%); 
RM = Self-constructed category of relationship marketing attributes (cooperation, trust, and 
client satisfaction). Simple count divided by the number of words ignoring articles (%); 
ExpYr = Number of years of lead partner’s working experience in auditing;  
Gender = % of female partners in the engagement; 
Distance = Distance (in miles) between the offices of state auditor and CPA firm;  
Fees = Proposed audit fees retrieved from proposal; 
WC = Raw number of words per audit proposal 
PC = 2000-2010 average Ranney measures of political competitiveness 
COR = State integrity scores 
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Table 3.3: Cross-Correlation Matrixa 
 Winning INDP COM RM ExpYr Top100 Prior SPEC  Fees Distance Gender PC COR WC 
Winning 1.000 -0.052 0.084 -0.059 0.020 -0.059 .311** 0.018 -0.084 0.037 0.018 0.021 0.103 0.010 
INDP -0.051 1.000 -.214** .224** 0.016 -0.013 -0.074 -0.066 -0.012 -.178** -0.101 -.120* -.213** .131* 
COM 0.089 -.204** 1.000 .259** -0.070 .132* 0.034 0.014 -.143* 0.002 .114* .425** .117* -.339** 
RM -0.037 .189** .271** 1.000 -0.062 .543** 0.010 .260** -0.080 -.421** 0.041 .209** -.127* -.127* 
ExpYr 0.038 0.019 -0.071 -0.082 1.000 -0.016 0.010 .135* -0.077 0.000 -0.079 0.007 -0.014 -0.005 
Top100 -0.059 -0.016 .123* .518** -0.031 1.000 -0.011 .430** .160** -.279** 0.008 .195** .183** .233** 
Prior .311** -0.064 0.038 0.013 0.022 -0.011 1.000 0.037 0.114 -0.038 0.009 .139* .190** -0.029 
SPEC  0.018 -0.079 0.009 .228** .133* .430** 0.037 1.000 -0.030 -.137* -0.043 0.005 0.040 .233** 
Fees -0.068 0.028 -.156** -0.091 -0.091 .199** 0.095 -0.026 1.000 0.089 -0.012 -0.012 .241** .332** 
Distance 0.036 -.197** 0.070 -.331** -0.052 -.166** -0.001 -0.101 .137* 1.000 .120* -.137* .195** 0.002 
Gender 0.022 -.115* 0.099 0.042 -0.087 -0.028 0.033 -0.081 -0.046 .197** 1.000 -.140* 0.027 -0.036 
PC 0.006 -0.082 .383** .156** -0.020 0.089 0.083 -0.036 -0.103 -0.095 -.146** 1.000 .330** -.332** 
COR 0.097 -.135* 0.070 -.148** -0.033 0.072 .169** -0.083 .302** .239** 0.021 .128* 1.000 0.017 
WC 0.035 .111* -.331** -0.090 -0.002 .271** -0.046 .226** .359** 0.031 -0.027 -.311** 0.003 1.000 
a  This table provides correlations among the variables used in subsequent tests. Spearman (Pearson) correlations are above (below) the diagonal. 
**,* Indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
Variable Definitions: 
Winning = 1 if client management helps to select the auditor, and 0 otherwise; 
INDP = Self-constructed category of independence. Simple count divided by the number of words ignoring articles (%).The data is 
transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
COM = Self-constructed category of competence. Simple count divided by the number of words ignoring articles (%).The data is 
transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
RM = Self-constructed category of relationship marketing attributes (cooperation, trust, and client satisfaction). Simple count divided by 
the number of words ignoring articles (%). 
ExpYr = Number of years of lead partner’s working experience in auditing. 
Table 3.3 (Continued) 
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Variable Definitions (continued): 
Top100 = 1 if the audit firm is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting Today, and 0 otherwise. 
Prior = 1 if the firm is the predecessor auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
SPEC = 1 if the firm is identified as a specialist in government auditing, and 0 otherwise. 
Fees = Natural logarithm of proposed audit fees; 
Distance = Distance (in miles) between the offices of state auditor and CPA firm. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
Gender = Percentage of female partners in the engagement; 
PC = 2000-2010 average Ranney measures of political competitiveness 
COR = State integrity scores. The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
91 
 
Table 3.4: Perceived Service Qualities and Auditor Selection Decision 
Column (1) (2) (3) 
 
N = 288 N= 332 N =332 MI 
 
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c 
Parameter β  p-value β  p-value β  p-value 
Intercept -4.620 .138 -7.222 .006 -4.934 .082 
INDP 0.109 .951 -.307 .844 .010 .995 
COM 0.957 .034 .940 .029 .919 .037 
RM -0.049 .834 -.038 .870 -.091 .692 
ExpYr 0.014 .447 .011 .558 .009 .631 
Top100 -0.652 .114 -.596 .113 -.423 .274 
Prior 1.539 .000 1.635 .000 1.772 .000 
SPEC 0.234 .479 .146 .648 .067 .837 
Fees -0.204 .101   -.337 .004 
Distance   0.000 .931 .000 .971 .001 .786 
Gender -0.001 .912 .001 .898 -.001 .895 
WC 0.636 .032 .525 .047 .727 .011 
R Square 0.165 0.159 - 
Classification 75.0 78.0 - 
Variable Definitions: 
INDP = Self-constructed category of independence. Simple count divided by the number of words 
ignoring articles (%). The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
COM = Self-constructed category of competence. Simple count divided by the number of words 
ignoring articles (%).The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
RM = Self-constructed category of relationship marketing attributes (cooperation, trust, and 
client satisfaction). Simple count divided by the number of words ignoring articles (%). 
ExpYr = Number of years of lead partner’s working experience in auditing. 
Top100 = 1 if the audit firm is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting Today, and 0 otherwise. 
Prior = 1 if the firm is the predecessor auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
SPEC = 1 if the firm is identified as a specialist in government auditing, and 0 otherwise. 
Fees = Natural logarithm of proposed audit fees. 
Distance = Distance (in miles) between the offices of state auditor and CPA firm. The data is 
transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
Gender = % of female partners in the engagement. 
WC = Natural logarithm of raw number of words per audit proposal. 
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Table 3.5: State Political Competition, Corruption Risk, and Audit Procurement Quality  
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 N = 288 N= 332 N = 288 N= 332 
 Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b 
Parameter β  p-value β  p-value β  p-value β  p-value 
Intercept -109.65 .029 -55.51 0.02 25.51 0.30 10.67 0.39 
INDP 24.98 .577 55.34 0.17 9.71 0.72 13.12 0.51 
COM 28.26 .058 24.15 0.08 -4.75 0.45 -3.60 0.52 
RM 6.57 .402 2.86 0.68 -6.34 0.14 -6.48 0.07 
ExpYr 0.24 .645 0.20 0.70 -0.19 0.52 -0.36 0.17 
Top100 -10.13 .405 -5.87 0.56 -1.65 0.76 0.74 0.86 
Prior -6.70 .431 -7.44 0.37 13.39 0.02 16.65 0.00 
SPEC 15.98 .080 11.82 0.18 6.57 0.19 4.34 0.29 
Fees 3.41 .279   -1.33 0.41   
WC 0.64 .058 0.45 0.12 0.68 0.03 0.59 0.04 
PC 121.76 .037 57.43 0.04     
PC by INDP -29.46 .573 -65.42 0.16     
PC by COM -31.99 .066 -27.12 0.10     
PC by RM -7.64 .400 -3.34 0.68     
PC by ExpYr -.27 .664 -0.22 0.71     
PC by Top100 10.89 .443 6.20 0.60     
PC by Prior 9.66 .329 10.72 0.26     
PC by SPEC -18.54 .085 -13.84 0.18     
PC by Fees -4.23 .255       
COR     -0.46 0.19 -0.26 0.12 
COR by INDP     -0.15 0.69 -0.21 0.46 
COR by COM     0.084 0.35 0.06 0.43 
COR by RM     0.09 0.14 0.10 0.07 
COR by ExpYr     0.00 0.48 0.01 0.15 
COR by 
Top100     0.02 0.85 -0.02 0.74 
COR by Prior     -0.17 0.04 -0.22 0.00 
COR by SPEC     -0.09 0.20 -0.06 0.32 
COR by Fees     0.02 0.48   
R Square 0.21 0.20 0.21 .21 
Classification 74.3 77.7 75.7 75.7 
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Table 3.5 (Continued) 
Variable Definitions: 
INDP = Self-constructed category of independence. Simple count divided by the number of words 
ignoring articles (%). The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
COM = Self-constructed category of competence. Simple count divided by the number of words 
ignoring articles (%).The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
RM = Self-constructed category of relationship marketing attributes (cooperation, trust, and client 
satisfaction). Simple count divided by the number of words ignoring articles (%). 
ExpYr = Number of years of lead partner’s working experience in auditing. 
Top100 = 1 if the audit firm is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting Today, and 0 otherwise. 
Prior = 1 if the firm is the predecessor auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
SPEC = 1 if the firm is identified as a specialist in government auditing, and 0 otherwise. 
Fees = Natural logarithm of proposed audit fees. 
Distance = Distance (in miles) between the offices of state auditor and CPA firm. The data is 
transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
Gender = % of female partners in the engagement. 
WC = Natural logarithm of raw number of words per audit proposal. 
PC = 2000-2010 average modified Ranney measures of political competitiveness; and 
COR = State integrity score winsorized at 95%. 
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Table 3.6: Results From Linear Mixed Effect Models 
Panel A: Estimates of Fixed Effects 
Column Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Parameter β  p-value β  p-value β  p-value 
Intercept -0.44 0.42 -18.61 0.04 4.67 0.33 
INDP 0.01 0.97 4.71 0.49 1.21 0.80 
COM 0.17 0.04 4.98 0.05 -1.05 0.34 
RM 0.00 0.99 1.23 0.36 -1.01 0.18 
ExpYr 0.00 0.34 0.06 0.53 -0.03 0.58 
Top100 -0.11 0.18 -1.56 0.46 -0.41 0.67 
Prior 0.30 0.00 -1.14 0.45 2.27 0.02 
SPEC 0.04 0.54 2.14 0.15 0.98 0.29 
Fees -0.04 0.12 0.55 0.32 -0.14 0.62 
Distance 0.00 0.92     
Gender 0.00 0.90     
WC 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.08 
PC 
 
 21.27 0.04   
PC by INDP 
 
 -5.51 0.49   
PC by COM 
 
 -5.62 0.06   
PC by RM 
 
 -1.41 0.36   
PC by ExpYr 
 
 -0.06 0.55   
PC by Top100 
 
 1.66 0.50   
PC by Prior 
 
 1.70 0.33   
PC by SPEC 
 
 -2.45 0.16   
PC by Fees 
 
 -0.69 0.29   
COR 
 
   -0.07 0.28 
COR by INDP 
 
   -0.02 0.78 
COR by COM 
 
   0.02 0.26 
COR by RM 
 
   0.01 0.18 
COR by ExpYr 
 
   0.00 0.52 
COR by 
Top100 
 
   0.00 0.74 
COR by Prior 
 
   -0.03 0.05 
COR by SPEC 
 
   -0.01 0.30 
COR by Fees 
 
   0.00 0.72 
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Table 3.6 (Continued) 
Panel B: Estimates of Covariance Parameters 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Residual 0.175 0.178 0.173 
EngRC(StateRC) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
StateRC 0.005 0.008 0.007 
FirmRC 0.009 0.003 0.008 
Variable Definitions: 
INDP = Self-constructed category of independence. Simple count divided by the number of 
words ignoring articles (%). The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% 
percentile. 
COM = Self-constructed category of competence. Simple count divided by the number of words 
ignoring articles (%).The data is transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
RM = Self-constructed category of relationship marketing attributes (cooperation, trust, and 
client satisfaction). Simple count divided by the number of words ignoring articles (%). 
ExpYr = Number of years of lead partner’s working experience in auditing. 
Top100 = 1 if the audit firm is listed as a Top100 CPA firm by Accounting Today, and 0 
otherwise. 
Prior = 1 if the firm is the predecessor auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
SPEC = 1 if the firm is identified as a specialist in government auditing, and 0 otherwise. 
Fees = Natural logarithm of proposed audit fees. 
Distance = Distance (in miles) between the offices of state auditor and CPA firm. The data is 
transformed by winsorizing at the 95% percentile. 
Gender = % of female partners in the engagement. 
WC = Natural logarithm of raw number of words per audit proposal. 
PC = 2000-2010 average modified Ranney measures of political competitiveness; and 
COR = State integrity score winsorized at 95%. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
Although procurements for audit services are common in the public sector, we 
know little about how audit firms communicate with prospective clients in a RFP process 
and on what basis government clients select auditors for audit services. This dissertation 
consists of two studies investigating audit proposals submitted for government audit 
engagements. The first study examines CPA firms’ impression management strategies 
that can exemplify a firm’s commercial and/or professional values. In the past decades, 
intensified competition in audit markets induces increasing awareness of 
commercialization (Humphrey and Moizer 1990) and results in adoption of relationship 
marketing-oriented strategies (Reid 2008). Researchers indicate that commercialization 
carried out by marketing activities has become a norm in professional service firms. For 
example, Broberg et al. (2013) find that auditors view marketing activities as an integral 
part of the auditing profession and build their competitive advantage on those activities 
(Hodges and Young 2009). Many have raised a concern about the development of 
commercialization (i.e., focusing on profitability and service to clients) as opposed to 
professionalism in the audit industry (e.g., Sweeney and Pierce 2004; Sweeney and 
McGarry 2011). In fact, some view auditors’ promotion on value-added audit services 
and close working relationships with clients as a possible preclusion of auditor 
independence (Beattie et al. 2000). Therefore, it is important to understand how a firm’s 
marketing materials relate to their professional values and whether the firm’s commercial 
image potentially conflicts with audit independence. 
The findings of the first study indicate that auditors use marketing language to 
impress their prospective clients. Specifically, CPA firms, especially the larger ones, are 
97 
likely to project a persona of a cooperative and trustworthy service provider, instead of an 
independent auditor, in audit proposals. The result resonates with the argument of 
Suddaby, Gendron, and Lam (2009) that competitive market conditions and 
organizational pressure may lead audit firms to emphasize commercial gain but discount 
ethical and independent values. Achieving a proper balance between professional and 
commercial interests is a challenge for both regulators and practitioners (e.g., Suddaby et 
al. 2009; Fiolleau et al. 2013). An over-emphasis on auditors’ commercial interests would 
reduce audit quality (e. g., Gendron 2002; Tackett, Wolf, and Claypool 2004; PCAOB 
2013). Responding to the PCAOB’s concern about a firm’s marketing materials, this 
study provides evidence of auditors’ commercial personae embodied in audit proposals. 
The findings imply that commercial considerations can drive CPA firms’ impression 
management and may jeopardize the perceived independence of CPA firms in a 
contracting process. The study has important policy and practice implications because the 
regulators and practitioners may need to reconsider and reevaluate what level and kind of 
marketing activities are appropriate for “independent” auditors. 
The second study of the dissertation discusses audit procurement practices and 
investigates the procurement quality in the public sector. The quality of government 
audits should be of interest to stakeholders including political interest groups and 
taxpayers because auditing provides a control function in monitoring public sector 
entities (e.g., Bendor 1990; Deis and Giroux 1994). Researchers provide empirical 
evidence that auditing plays an essential role in enhancing efficiency in the use of public 
resources, such as optimal resource allocation in government operations (Saito and 
Mcintosh 2010). As audit procurement practices are deemed as a mechanism for ensuring 
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audit quality (GAO 1986; AICPA 1987), it is important to understand whether auditor 
selection decisions are made depending on auditors’ perceived audit service qualities as 
recommended by regulators. For example, the GFOA suggests that in an audit 
procurement process, “the principal factor in the selection of an independent auditor is 
the auditor’s ability to perform a quality audit” and that “in no case should price be 
allowed to serve as the sole criterion for selection of an independent auditor” (GFOA 
2002 p. 2). 
This study finds that auditors who evidence competence and qualification in their 
proposals are more likely to be selected in a RFP process. However, I do not find 
significant results for other perceived audit service qualities including independence, 
relationship marketing, firm reputation, team expertise, and industry specialization. On 
the other hand, the result suggests that a preexisting relationship between auditors and 
clients predicts auditor selection. Although I cannot comment on the ultimate level of 
audit quality provided by the selected auditors in my sample, the study results support 
Fiolleau’s et al. (2013) suggestion of a market demand for auditor attributes other than 
independence. Research suggests that political competition and corruption would affect 
public officials’ behavior and decisions in public resource management (e.g., budgeting, 
spending); however, this study does not find the impact of these political environment 
factors on audit procurement quality. 
4.1. Limitations 
Several inherent limitations of a word counting approach have been discussed in 
the early chapters. Language is highly contextual, and a word count program, like LIWC, 
may fail to capture different context and thus misclassify some words. However, this 
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issue could be inconsequential as Berry et al. (1997) suggest that the number of 
misclassifications in LIWC should be small compared with the number of correct 
classifications. Another major limitation relates to the dataset of audit proposals. Because 
the proposals obtained were submitted for government audit engagements in 15 U.S. 
states, the generalizability of the study results may be limited. Lastly, although audit 
proposals is a key element in a RFP process, other factors (e.g., personal or professional 
relationships between the parties) may affect a client’s auditor choice. Future research 
can collect information on those ex-ante connections and factor them into the auditor 
selection model. 
4.2. Contributions 
This paper contributes to auditing research in several ways. First, to my 
knowledge, the dataset of audit proposals is new and unexplored in research. Audit 
proposals are the key element in a RFP process; this unique data set facilitates our 
understanding of how CPA firms market their services through impression management. 
The findings expand the auditing literature investigating auditors' relationship marketing 
strategies. Second, this study employs emerging corpus linguistic methods to analyze the 
audit proposals and reveals the promises made by auditors to their public sector audit 
clients. This paper is among the first to create and validate word categories that capture 
these critical messages communicated through audit proposals. Third, the first study 
responds to the PCAOB's call for attention to CPA firms' commercial considerations that 
may influence audit performance. The results provides insights on how audit firms’ 
impression management, when driven by their commercial interests, can be a potential 
threat to auditor independence in appearance. This type of the threat has not yet been 
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widely recognized by the literature or regulations. Although the results are from public 
audits data, we would expect to see auditors engage in more relationship marketing 
strategies in the private sector where auditors’ commercial interests prevail. Lastly, the 
second study expands the auditing literature in perceived audit service qualities. To date, 
research generally surveys audit clients' to assess their perceptions of audit quality 
attributes. This study directly assesses the links of perceived audit quality attributes at 
both the firm and individual level to clients' auditor selections. The findings on the power 
of the language in marketing materials provide implications for practitioners and 
regulators. Practicing auditors can emphasize their competitive advantages using 
convincing language but should be also mindful about their marketing language that may 
leave an impression not intended by the firms. Audit quality has multiple dimensions, and 
the trade-off among desirable audit attributes has been a difficult issue for regulators 
(Fiolleau et al. 2013). Regulators should consider ways to constraint or monitor audit 
firms’ intensive marketing activities, which have the potential to impair auditors’ 
independence in fact and/or in appearance. 
4.3. Future Research 
The current study examines how CPA firms compose audit proposals as an 
impression management tool. As the audiences of audit proposals are potential audit 
clients, CPA firms may create an image with attributes preferred by clients, but not by the 
public. Future research could investigate other marketing tools (e.g., media, websites, and 
newsletters) that CPA firms use to communicate with the external public including 
potential clients, investors, and regulators. In addition, the current study does not directly 
examine the association between auditor impression management and clients’ perceptions 
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of auditor independence. Future research could employ experiments to investigate the 
causality of auditors’ marketing language and decision makers’ perceptions and their 
auditor choices. The current study examines audit procurement practices by state audit 
agencies (i.e., an independent party). Future research examining this topic could focus on 
procurement conducted by audited government entities (i.e., auditee) and investigate 
whether desirable audit quality attributes that predict auditor selection would be different 
if the role of decision makers changes. Although the current study does not find an 
association between the environment factors and audit procurement quality, future 
research can explore other factors (i.e., auditee characteristics) which may influence the 
effectiveness of audit procurement practices. 
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Appendix 
Development of Word Lists and Dictionary Validation Process 
I followed Pennebaker et al.'s (2007) procedures39 to validate the linguistic 
constructs. These included the following steps to develop an initial list of words for each 
word category identified in Table 2.2 and 2.4 and to validate the developed dictionaries 
through a survey instrument. 
Step 1: Use test observations (i.e., audit proposals) to develop an initial list of words. 
Five test observations were randomly selected from the dataset of 363 observations. I 
reviewed those five files and removed content to generate an analyzable text file of the 
proposals. Removed content include cover page, table of contents, images, tables, charts, 
engagement personnel resume, client references, peer review report, and standard forms 
required by request-for-proposal (RFP) documents. The removed information is related to 
either boilerplate (recurring) text from RFP documents (e.g., restatements of text from the 
RFP) or will be captured by other quantitative measures. 
Using an online text analyzer provided by Online-Utility.org40, I created a word 
frequency table for each cleaned text file. I then developed initial lists of words for the 
word categories by reviewing the frequency tables and assigning a word to its 
corresponding word category. I further expanded the word lists based on several relevant 
sources, including AICPA Code of Profession Conduct, Organizational Trust Inventory 
Scale (Cummings and Bromiley 1996), the Pinto and Pinto Cooperation scale (Pinto and 
Pinto 1990), and online English dictionaries (i.e., Thesaurus.com). 
Step 2: Hire independent judges to validate the reliability of the word dictionaries 
Accounting professionals were recruited to review the preliminary word lists and 
complete a survey instrument, which requires them to assess the word lists. The 
instrument consisted of two tasks: Inclusion and Matching. Participants reviewed a 
definition table for the attributes of interest and had to pass five knowledge check 
questions before proceeding to the following tasks. Participants completed these two 
tasks in random order. 
1. Inclusion: in this task, judges first reviewed several word lists grouped by category 
and then decided whether a word in an assigned category should be included or not. 
Specifically, they determined whether to (1) add words to the category and/or (2) 
remove an existing word from the category.  
39 This article is published by LIWC.net, Austin, Texas 78703 USA in conjunction with the LIWC2007 
software program. 
40 This website provides several free online software utilities, such as readability calculator and text 
analyzer, and can be found at http://www.online-utility.org/text/analyzer.jsp 
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2. Matching: in this task, judges reviewed an alphabetized word list and assigned each 
word in the list to a corresponding category. In addition to the identified word 
categories, a "none of the above" option is also given. 
Step 3: Analyze the survey responses 
I received nine responses from three professors and six accounting professionals from 
state audit agencies. To test the degree of agreement among the judges, I performed the 
following analyses: 
1. Performed a correlation analysis of the inclusion data to identify the judges whose 
responses are highly correlated with the others. Next, I ranked the judges by the sum 
of their correlation coefficients. 
2. Paired judges and, for each pair, converted the matching data to a score of 0 or 1 (1= 
judges have the same response for a word assignment; 0= otherwise). Summed the 
scores for each judge and calculated the degree of the agreement among the judges as 
a percentage (i.e., a judge's score/6041). I also ranked the judges by their agreement 
percentage. 
3. Based on the judges' rank in the tasks and taking their work experience and number of 
proposals reviewed into consideration, I created two pools of judges - one includes 7 
judges (the top 7) and the other includes 4 judges (the top 4). The following table 
shows data for these pools. 
 
 Pool 1 Pool 2 
Members 3 professors and 4 
professionals 
1 professor and 3 
professionals 
Average r for inclusion data 0.41 0.53 
Average % (degree of agreement) 
for converted matching data 
56% 61% 
Average # of proposals reviewed  10.1 14.3 
Min # of proposals reviewed / 
judge 
3 6 
# of years of work experience 24.4 22.5 
 
 
41 If a judge's responses completely agree with others', this judge will receive a total score of 60 (1 for each 
word matching). 
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Step 4: Finalize the word lists based on survey responses 
I created three sets of word dictionaries. Set A is based on Pool 1 responses; Set B is 
based on Pool 2 responses; Sec C is based on 5 observations of audit proposals (the 
original word lists). I used the following criteria in developing Set A and B. 
1. A word is assigned to a category based on the majority of the judges' responses (i.e., 
mode) across both the inclusion and matching tasks.  
2. If the majority of the judges voted against including a word in a category in the 
inclusion task, (i.e., the votes for inclusion are 3 or fewer), then I assigned the word to 
a category using the judges' responses in the matching task.  
3. An inconsistency occurs when the modal category, across tasks (inclusion, matching), 
differs. In these cases, I summed the judges' votes across the tasks (hence n = 14, i.e., 
7x2) and assigned the word to the modal category across votes. When there is a tie, 
i.e., when there were equal votes, counting votes across the matching and inclusion 
task, I used the judges' responses in the matching task since the matching task 
requires an explicit choice of category, whereas the inclusion task requires only 
agreement with a pre-assigned category (i.e., judges had to drag a word to a category 
instead of simply clicking Yes or No). 
4. For set B, when there was a tie across the matching and inclusion votes, I followed 
the same logic as is described above for Set A, only using the data in set B to resolve 
the tie. This occurred in 1 out of 62 cases. In cases where the set B data did not allow 
for the resolution of ties, I used the procedure for set A, and the Set A data, to resolve 
the tie. This occurred in 2 out of 62 cases. 
5. Compared with the original word lists, Set C, there are 16 differences with Set A, and, 
14 differences with Set B. 
Step 5: Test the internal reliability of the dictionaries 
To test the internal reliability of the specific words within each category, I followed 
Pennebaker et al.'s (LIWC2007) procedures to calculate Cronbach alphas, both the binary 
and raw/uncorrected alphas, for each category. For each word dictionary (Set A, B, and 
C), I created a dictionary file for each word category. Next, I ran LIWC with the 
dictionary files and used the LIWC outputs to calculate Cronbach alphas in SPSS. The 
raw or uncorrected alphas are based on the percentage of use of each of the category 
words within the texts. The binary alphas are computed on the occurrence/non-
occurrence of each dictionary word (i.e., converting the usage of each of the dictionary 
words within a given text into either a 0 (not used) or a 1 (used one or more times)). 
Based on the results of the Cronbach test, I used the dictionary Set B in my text analysis 
in this study. The Cronbach alphas reported in Table 2.2 and 2.4 are based on dictionary 
B. 
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